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CHAPTER	1:	INTRODUCTION	The	global	nature	of	the	Great	Recession	led	to	the	resurgence	of	literature	trying	to	 find	 a	 link	 between	 international	 channels	 and	 international	 business	 cycle	synchronization.	 Understanding	 the	 impact	 of	 international	 channels	 on	 exaggerating	fluctuations	 in	 macro	 variables	 is	 of	 paramount	 importance.	 Sharp	 decline	 in	 global	output	 following	 the	 2007	 crash	 was	 the	 worst	 seen	 in	 decades.	 According	 to	 BEA	estimates,	U.S	GDP	fell	by	6.2,	consumption	by	4.3	and	investment	by	22	percent	during	the	last	quarter	of	2008.	This	behavior	was	experienced	amongst	most	OECD	countries,	even	though	the	source	of	the	negative	shock	had	its	roots	largely	in	the	U.S.	There	was	an	unprecedented	synchronous	downturn	amongst	most	developed	countries.	Figure	1	represents	 the	 global	 nature	 of	 the	 recent	 crisis	 and	 demonstrates	 a	 remarkable	synchronous	 collapse	 in	 economic	 growth	 rates	 across	 the	 developed	 world.	Furthermore,	 the	synchronous	behavior	of	output	growth	rates	 is	stronger	during	 the	2008	 recession	 than	 in	 years	 prior	 or	 after.	 This	 provides	 some	 evidence,	 albeit	anecdotal,	 that	 cross-country	 correlations	 do	 not	 exhibit	 symmetric	 behavior	 during	expansions	and	recessions.	In	chapter	3,	I	investigate	this	asymmetric	behavior	using	a	two-country	dynamic	stochastic	general	equilibrium	model.	The	biggest	contribution	of	chapter	3	 is	 to	 test	how	macro	variables	move	across	 two	countries	by	allowing	 for	a	switch	between	expansionary	and	recessionary	phases.	I	find	that	variables	move	more	synchronously	during	recessions	than	expansions.		An	equally	important	question	arising	from	the	great	recession	was	the	impact	of	monetary	policy	on	macro	variables.	Most	central	banks	went	beyond	the	normal	limits	of	monetary	policy.	In	that	regard,	I	test	the	long	run	monetary	neutrality,	which	states	that	 money	 has	 no	 effect	 on	 real	 variables	 in	 the	 long	 run.	 I	 focus	 on	 testing	 how	
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temporal	aggregation	affects	the	results.	These	tests	are	carried	out	in	chapter	4	of	this	paper.		
Figure	1:	Real	GDP	growth	in	percent,	annual	OECD	database	
		 To	 combat	 the	 global	 recession,	 most	 central	 banks	 used	 monetary	 and	quantitative	easing.	This	brings	 to	 the	 forefront	a	heavily	researched,	yet	 inconclusive	macro	 phenomenon	 of	 money	 neutrality;	 which	 states	 that	 money	 only	 temporarily	effects	 macro	 variables.	 I	 explore	 these	 two	 macroeconomic	 questions.	 First,	 I	investigate	 how	 propagation	 of	 shocks	 through	 international	 financial	 channels	asymmetrically	affects	output	correlation.	Second,	I	carry	out	statistical	tests	to	test	for	money	neutrality	in	G-7	countries.			The	impact	on	an	economy	due	to	international	 interdependence	can	be	due	to	either	trade	or	financial	linkages.	Like	the	Great	Depression	of	the	1930’s,	the	financial	crisis	 that	 plagued	 much	 of	 the	 developed	 world	 in	 2007	 has	 led	 to	 considerable	research	seeking	to	understand	the	causes	and	nature	of	such	global	phenomenon.	Even	
-6
-5
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
United States Japan Euro	area OECD
		
3	
though	 the	 source	 of	 the	 financial	 crisis	 of	 2007	was	 limited	 to	 a	 few	 countries,	 the	economic	impact	was	unquestionably	global.		Trade	alone	could	not	account	for	the	severity	of	the	synchronous	downturn.	Given	that	 regional	 trade	 far	exceeds	 that	between	regions,	 trade	alone	cannot	explain	 such	output	correlation.	Moreover,	since	U.S	was	the	severest	source	for	the	financial	crisis,	the	assumption	for	trade	to	be	an	important	channel	would	imply	that	synchronization	between	 the	U.S	 and	 regional	 trade	partners	 such	 as	Canada	or	Mexico	 should	be	 far	greater.	But	we	see	a	corresponding	sharp	decline	in	output	for	countries	that	are	only	marginally	linked	to	the	U.S.	Hence,	it	is	worth	investigating	the	role	financial	channels	play.	To	represent	financial	integration,	an	examination	of	total	short-term	claims	of	U.S	reporting	banks	of	claims	on	foreign	economy	is	warranted.	Table	1	shows	total	stock	of	U.S	banks	claims	on	other	countries	with	up	 to	and	 less	 than	one	year	until	maturity.	The	 amount	 of	 new	 or	 near	maturity	 claims	 issued	 contracted	 sharply	 following	 the	recession.	 In	 normal	 times,	 new	 claims	 are	 regularly	 issued	 and	many	maturing	 ones	are	reissued	quarterly.	The	countries	 included	are	the	ones	with	which	U.S	has	strong	financial	ties.	Many	OECD	countries	experienced	a	sharp	fall	in	short-term	claims	of	U.S	banks	 during	 2008.	 As	 the	 Deputy	 Governor	 of	 the	 Reserve	 Bank	 of	 India,	 Rakesh	Mohan	 said:	 “Our	 problems	 are	 mainly	 due	 to	 the	 sell-off	 by	 foreign	 institutional	investors	 in	 the	 domestic	markets	 leading	 to	 a	 sharp	 reduction	 in	 net	 capital	 inflows	and	 the	 sharp	 slowdown	 in	 global	 economic	 activity	 and	 external	 demand”	 (Mohan,	2009)		
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Table	1:	Bank	Assets	
Short	term	claims	of	U.S	banks	on	select	OECD	countries	in	$US	millions		 2008,	Q1	 2008,	Q4	 Percent	change	Canada	 168,565	 145,010	 -13.97%	France	 69,098	 55,287	 -19.98%	Germany	 65,933	 39,266	 -40.4%	Ireland	 27,471	 23,550	 -14.27%	Italy	 25,521	 17,243	 -32.43%	Netherlands	 46,995	 37,230	 -20.77%	Spain	 28,367	 18,420	 -35.06%	Data	is	from	BIS	International	Banking	Statistics		 To	sum	up	my	motivation	to	analyze	financial	links	and	their	asymmetric	effect	on	output	correlation,	I	run	some	simple	regressions	before	getting	into	the	theoretical	model.	I	use	change	in	real	GDP	growth	from	year	to	year	as	the	dependent	variable.	I	run	the	same	regressions	across	two	time	periods.	One	from	1996	to	2006	and	another	for	 just	one	year;	December	2007	to	December	2008.	The	latter	period	represents	the	financial	crash.	To	measure	sudden	change	in	capital	outflows	in	a	country,	I	take	total	capital	 inflows	 from	 the	 U.S.	 as	 a	 percent	 of	 that	 countries’	 GDP	 using	 U.S	 Treasury	International	Capital	data	(TIC)	in	year	t-1.	To	differentiate	between	financial	and	trade	links,	I	take	exports	to	the	U.S	as	a	percent	of	GDP,	or	variable	X.	To	represent	“flight	to	quality”	by	 investors,	 I	 include	 credit	 rating	of	 a	 country,	 representing	 their	 ability	 to	raise	more	capital.	Capital	withdrawals	will	affect	countries	with	lower	sovereign	credit	rating	more	severely.	Standard	and	Poor	provides	sovereign	rating	ranging	from	AAA	to	B	 for	 the	countries	 in	my	sample	and	 like	Devereux	and	Yetman,	 I	assign	a	numerical	value	to	each	rating	as	represented	in	Table	2.	I	interact	the	rating	term	(CR)	with	X	and	TIC	to	account	 for	“flight	 to	quality”.	The	data	 is	 for	29	OECD	countries	with	available	data.1		
																																																																				1	The	countries	included	are:	Australia,	Austria,	Belgium,	Canada,	Czech	Republic,	Denmark,	Finland,	France,	Germany,	Greece,	Hungary,	Iceland,	Ireland,	Italy,	Japan,	Korea,	Luxembourg,	Mexico,	
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Table	2:	Credit	Rating	conversion	
S&P	letter	rating	 My	conversion	 Meaning	AAA	 0	 Extremely	strong	AA+	 1	 Very	strong	AA	 2	 Very	strong	AA-	 3	 Very	strong	A+	 4	 Strong	A	 5	 Strong	A-	 6	 Strong	BBB+	 7	 Adequate	BBB	 8	 Adequate	BBB-	 9	 Adequate	BB+	 10	 Faces	major	future	uncertainties	BB	 11	 Faces	major	future	uncertainties	B	 12	 Faces	major	uncertainties	Standard	and	Poor	sovereign	credit	rating	of	a	country			 The	results	are	presented	in	Table	3.	There	is	strong	evidence	that	not	only	does	financial	 flows	 play	 a	 significant	 role	 in	 the	 financial	 crisis,	 but	 that	 the	 impact	 is	stronger	during	recessions.	Moreover,	trade	appears	to	be	less	important.	The	measure	of	capital	 flows	 is	significant	 in	all	cases	and	has	an	adverse	effect	on	GDP.	This	effect	becomes	stronger	when	capital	inflows	interact	with	credit	rating.	The	interactive	term	between	 credit	 rating	 and	 capital	 inflows	 from	 the	 U.S	 is	 negative	 and	 statistically	significant,	supporting	the	notion	of	“flight	to	quality”.		To	summarize,	financial	channels	are	important	in	propagating	shocks	to	output	and	more	importantly	those	effects	are	stronger	during	recessions.				
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Table	3:	Asymmetrical	significance	of	financial	channels	on	output	growth			
Financial	impact	during	expansionary	years	1996-2006		X	 0.04	(0.788)	 0.009	(0.89)	 	 	 0.05	(0.695)	CRX	 	 −0.016	(0.76)	 	 	 0.039	(0.144)	TIC	 	 	 −0.001	
(0.045)	
−0.001	
(0.006)	
−0.017	
(0.005)	CRTIC	 	 	 	 −0.046	
(0.022)	
−0.08	
(0.009)	Adjusted	R2	 0.02	 0.14	 0.44	 0.29	 0.4	N	 319	 319	 319	 319	 319	Dependent	variable:	change	in	real	GDP	growth	rate	between	December	1996	and	2006		p	values	are	in	parenthesis	and	coefficients	that	are	bold	are	significant	at	the	5%	level	X	represents	exports	to	the	U.S.	CR	represents	S&P	sovereign	foreign	currency	credit	rating.	Capital	withdrawals	are	likely	to	affect	more	significantly	countries	with	worse	rating.	CRX	is	the	interactive	term	between	X	and	CR	TIC	is	gross	capital	inflows	from	the	US	as	a	percent	of	GDP	in	t-1.	This	measures	a	country’s	sudden	outflow	of	capital	using	US	Treasury	data	CRTIC	is	the	interactive	term	between	TIC	and	CR		
Financial	impact	on	the	‘Great	Recession’	2007-2008	Exports	to	US	(X)	 −0.024	(0.844)	 0.003	(0.99)	 	 	 −0.043	(0.665)	CRX	 	 −0.006	(0.77)	 	 	 0.039	(0.144)	TIC	 	 	 −0.005	
(0.035)	
−0.006	
(0.006)	
−0.047	
(0.006)	CRTIC	 	 	 	 −0.057	
(0.012)	
−0.1	
(0.019)	Adjusted	R2	 0.036	 0.07	 0.14	 0.3	 0.33	N	 29	 29	 29	 29	 29	Dependent	variable:	change	in	real	GDP	growth	rate	between	December	2007	and	2008		 	 The	neutrality	of	money	is	amongst	one	of	the	most	important	research	question	in	macroeconomics.	 Given	 how	much	 emphasis	was	 paid	 by	 the	 Federal	 Reserve,	 the	European	Central	Bank	and	other	central	bankers	around	the	world	in	combatting	the	recession	 of	 2007,	 it	 is	 worth	 investigating	 the	 role	 of	 money	 in	 impacting	 macro	variables.	The	Fed	took	the	traditional	measure	of	reducing	the	federal	funds	rate	from	5.25	percent	 in	September	2007	to	between	0-0.25	percent	by	December	2008.	(Rich,	2009).	They	also	took	several	untraditional	measures	like	buying	long	term	debt	worth	$1.75	 trillion	 in	 the	 form	 of	 mortgage	 backed	 securities	 and	 making	 direct	 loans	 to	private	corporations.	AIG,	for	example	got	an	emergency	loan	to	the	tune	of	$85	billion.		
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The	ECB,	Bank	of	England	and	other	central	banks	took	similar	measures.	Even	though	these	 policies	 had	 the	 desired	 results	 of	 providing	 stimulus	 in	 the	 short	 run,	 it	 is	important	 to	 understand	 whether	 such	 policies	 have	 any	 long	 run	 effects	 on	 the	economy.			Neutrality	of	money	states	that	permanent	movements	in	money	supply	do	not	effect	real	variables	like	real	GDP,	employment	and	real	consumption.	Any	affect	it	has	is	temporary	and	disappears	once	rational	agents	adjust	their	behavior.	There	are	two	related	concepts:	 the	 long	run	money	neutrality	(LMN)	and	the	 long	run	money	super	neutrality	 (LMSN).	LMSN	hypothesis	 states	 that	permanent	movements	 in	 the	growth	rate	 of	 money	 supply,	 rather	 than	 the	 level	 of	 money	 supply,	 has	 no	 effect	 on	 real	variables.	Given	the	importance	of	both	LMN	and	LMSN	on	monetary	policy,	it	is	worth	examining	 this	 considerably	 debated	 topic.	 Such	 tests	 provide	 several	 empirical	complications	and	one	must	be	careful	in	the	kind	of	data	and	tests	used.		 Empirical	 tests	 on	 monetary	 neutrality	 have	 been	 much	 less	 convincing	 than	theory	would	suggest.	Differences	in	statistical	methods	and	data	sources	used	in	earlier	studies	might	be	a	source	of	such	disparity	in	results.	Temporal	aggregation	of	data	and	structural	 regime	 changes	 can	 also	 distort	 results.	 In	 chapter	 4	 I	 focus	 on	 testing	 the	impact	of	temporal	aggregation	on	results.	I	use	monthly,	quarterly	and	yearly	data	and	find	that	VAR	results	are	very	sensitive	to	temporal	aggregation.	When	aggregating	data	at	 the	 annual	 frequency,	 time	 series	 autocorrelations	 are	 driven	 down	 to	 zero.	 (Tiao,	1972)	 (Rossana	 &	 Hu,	 2017)	 As	 in	 Rossana	 and	 Hu,	 I	 use	 I	 (1)	 data,	 which	 upon	temporal	aggregation	of	the	data	results	 in	only	on	nonzero	sample	autocorrelation	in	the	 asymptotic	 limit.	 Rossana	 and	 Seater	 provide	 evidence	 that	 once	 data	 has	 been	aggregated	to	annual	frequency,	asymptotic	limits	in	Tiao	(1972)	are	reached	in	every	time	series.	This	 implies	that	any	cyclical	variation	in	the	data	 is	driven	out	by	annual	
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aggregation	 and	 estimated	 coefficients	 in	 time	 series	 regression	 can	 be	 wrongfully	estimated	to	be	zero.	(Rossana	&	Seater,	1992)	(Rossana	&	Seater,	1995)	Hence,	there	is	a	potential	bias	towards	time-series	regression	finding	monetary	neutrality	by	driving	coefficients	 to	 zero.	 In	 chapter	4,	 I	 investigate	 the	 effects	 temporal	 aggregation	might	have	on	money	neutrality	tests.	I	use	the	Fisher	and	Seater	framework	to	estimate	the	Bartlett	estimator	and	the	King	and	Watson	VAR	approach	to	test	for	neutrality	and	the	effects	of	 temporal	 aggregation	 for	G-7	 countries.	The	 results	 are	mixed	but	one	very	appealing	feature	of	the	F	&	S	test	is	that	the	results	are	not	biased	with	that	temporal	aggregation.	There	might	still	be	biases	from	structural	changes,	which	I	do	not	address	in	 this	 paper.	 Rossana	 and	 Hu	 investigate	 biases	 due	 to	 temporal	 aggregation	 and	structural	change	for	the	U.S	economy	(Rossana	&	Hu,	2017).																
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CHAPTER	2:	LITERATURE	REVIEW	
	 In	this	paper,	I	am	investigating	two	important	macro	questions.	The	focus	of	my	first	 question	 is	 to	 study	 the	 asymmetric	 role	 of	 financial	 linkages	 on	 international	business	 cycle	 correlation.	 The	 second	 question	 focuses	 on	 considering	 the	 role	 of	temporal	 aggregation	 on	 money	 neutrality	 tests.	 Regarding	 the	 first,	 there	 are	 two	important	 phenomena	 to	 consider.	 First,	 international	 financial	 markets	 have	 seen	 a	momentous	 increase	 in	 capital	 flow	 in	 recent	 decades.	 (Lane	 &	 Milesi-Ferretti,	 The	external	wealth	of	nations	mark	2:	Revised	and	extended	measures	of	foreign	assets	and	liabilities	 for	 industrial	 and	 developing	 countries,	 2007)	 Cross	 border	 asset	 holdings	have	grown	to	such	an	extent	that	for	some	developed	economies	it	exceeds	their	GDP.	(Lane	 &	 Milesi-Ferretti,	 2003).	 Various	 studies	 have	 analyzed	 welfare	 gains	 from	international	 financial	 integration	 in	 a	 theoretical	 and	 empirical	 setting.	 (Bonfiglioli,	2008)	 (Kose,	 Prasad,	 &	 Terrones,	 Does	 financial	 globalization	 promote	 risk	 sharing?,	2009b)	 (Nicolo	 &	 Juvenal,	 2012)	 (Devereux	 &	 Sutherland,	 Evaluating	 international	financial	integration	under	leverage	constraints,	2011)	Economic	theory	contends	that	countries	 allocate	 their	 resources	 to	 diversify	 risk	 across	 borders.	 We	 are	 moving	toward	 an	 ever-increasing	 integration	 of	 financial	 markets	 because	 information	technology	 is	 lowering	 transactions	 costs	 and	 of	 innovations	 in	 financial	 assets.	 One	way	 to	quantify	 financial	 integration	 is	 to	 look	 at	 bank	portfolios	 and	 their	 claims	on	foreign	 countries’	 assets.	 Bank	 portfolios	 are	 a	 direct	 way	 to	 measure	 home	 bank’s	influence	over	 foreign	 country’s	 investment.	As	described	 later	 in	 this	 chapter,	 this	 is	the	 mechanism	 through	 which	 financial	 propagation	 affects	 both	 home	 and	 foreign	countries	in	my	model.			A	 second	 phenomenon	 that	 has	 generated	 substantial	 research	 is	 measuring	whether	business	cycles	across	countries	have	become	more	synchronized.	The	answer	
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to	this	question	is	less	conclusive	and	varies	with	the	source	of	shocks,	but	does	point	towards	 an	 increase	 in	 synchronization.	 (Bordo	 &	 Helbling,	 2003).	 Their	 findings	indicate	that	global	shocks	are	more	important	in	driving	this	integration	and	that	trade	only	 plays	 a	 modest	 role.	 Bordo	 and	 Helbling	 find	 a	 trend	 towards	 increased	synchronization	across	diverse	exchange	rate	regimes.	(Bordo	&	Helbling,	International	business	cycle	synchronization	in	historical	perspective,	2011)	Using	a	factor-structural	VAR,	Stock	and	Watson	analyzed	the	structure	of	international	business	cycle	dynamics	and	 found	 that	 common	 shocks	 across	 countries	 increases	 volatility	 and	synchronization.	(Stock	&	Watson,	2005).	They	found	BCS	during	the	2007	crisis	to	be	significant	amongst	G-7	countries.		Even	though	evidence	for	global	business	cycle	synchronization	is	 inconclusive,	one	 observes	 business	 cycles	 between	 certain	 countries	 and	 depending	 on	 nature	 of	shocks	to	be	more	strongly	correlated	now	than	in	past	decades.	And	this	leads	to	two	fundamental	 questions	 that	 are	 addressed	 in	 this	 chapter;	 “does	 financial	 integration	have	any	contribution	to	this	synchronization?”	and	“whether	these	contributions	have	an	asymmetric	effect	on	macro	variables	 like	consumption	and	 investment	depending	on	the	state	of	the	economy?”	A	thorough	understanding	would	enable	policymakers	to	counter	observable	shocks	through	these	channels.	The	goal	of	this	chapter	is	to	provide	a	 simple,	 testable	 model	 for	 these	 assertions.	 I	 use	 an	 already	 developed	 theoretical	model	 to	 test	 the	 first	question.	For	 the	second	question,	 I	estimate	a	parameter	via	a	Markov	 regime	 process	 that	 represents	 the	 two	 states	 of	 a	 business	 cycle.	 The	parameter	 then	 enables	 me	 to	 measure	 cross-country	 behavior	 of	 consumption,	investment,	 interest	 rate,	 asset	 portfolios	 and	 asset	 prices	 across	 recessions	 and	expansions.	I	find	that	international	synchronization	during	recessions	is	stronger	than	expansions.	Guillermo	Ordonez	studies	the	asymmetries	of	financial	frictions	and	finds	
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it	 stronger	 amongst	 financially	 less	 developed	 countries	 	 (Ordonez,	 2013)	This	 paper	tries	 to	 add	 to	 that	 answer.	 Specifically,	 I	 find	 that	 strong	 financial	 links	 cause	asymmetric	synchronous	behavior.			A	surge	in	global	trade	flows	in	recent	decades	is	a	potential	candidate	in	causing	business	cycles	to	be	more	correlated.	However,	most	of	the	increase	in	trade	is	inter-regional	and	not	global.	(Kose	&	Yi,	Can	the	standard	international	business	cycle	model	explain	the	relation	between	trade	and	comovement,	2006)	And	since	international	BCS	is	 across	 continents,	 trade	 alone	 cannot	 be	 a	 significant	 factor.	 Hence	 it	 is	 worth	investigating	 the	 role	 financial	 linkages	 plays	 both	 in	 transmitting	 shocks	 and	magnifying	the	effects	of	those	shocks.	Empirical	evidence	is	inconclusive.	Using	a	panel	of	 twenty	countries	Kalemli	and	his	co-authors	 find	 there	 to	be	a	negative	correlation	between	 financial	 links	 and	 transmission	 of	 shocks	 (Kalemli-Ozcan,	 Papaioannou,	 &	Peydro,	2009).	Imbs	find	that	the	correlation	between	the	two	is	strongly	dependent	on	the	 source	 of	 shocks	 where	 common	 shock	 tends	 to	 lower	 BCS	 and	 country-specific	shock	increases	synchronization	between	countries	that	are	more	ﬁnancially	integrated	(Cesa-Bianchi,	Imbs,	&	Saleheen,	2016).	There	is	also	evidence	that	BCS	is	stronger	for	countries	 that	 have	 more	 financial	 linkages.	 (Imbs,	 The	 real	 effects	 of	 financial	integration,	 2006)	 (Imbs,	 Trade,	 finance,	 specialization	 and	 synchronization,	 2004)	However,	many	studies	like	these	are	purely	empirical	exercises	and	are	not	based	on	micro-founded	models.	 Krugman	 points	 out	 that	 unlike	 trade	 literature,	 international	financial	studies	lacks	a	multiplier	effect	(Krugman,	2008).	One	where	financial	shocks	in	one	country	affect	macro	variables	in	both	home	and	foreign	countries.	This	chapter	uses	 the	 theoretical	 model	 developed	 by	 Devereux	 and	 Yetman	 and	 the	 solution	technique	developed	by	Devereux	and	Sutherland	 to	 test	my	hypothesis.	 (Devereux	&	Yetman,	 Leverage	 constraints	 and	 the	 international	 transmission	 of	 shocks,	 2010)	
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(Devereux	 &	 Sutherland,	 Country	 portfolios	 in	 open	 economy	 macro	 models,	 2011).	Devereux	 and	 Yetman	 develop	 a	 micro-founded	 model	 of	 balance	 sheet	 channel	 for	international	transmitted	shocks.	The	financial	multipliers	pointed	out	by	Krugman	are	incorporated	 through	 cross-country	 balance	 sheet	 connections	 distributed	 between	investors	and	financial	institutions	(Krugman,	2008).	For	example,	if	asset	prices	fall	in	country	 A,	 independent	 of	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 shock,	 it	 will	 negatively	 impact	 balance	sheets	 for	 institutions	 and	 the	 economy	 in	 country	A.	 Since	 country	B	 investors	 have	investments	in	financial	institutions	of	country	A,	their	portfolio	and	thus	consumption	also	 deteriorates.	 In	 the	 crisis	 of	 2007,	 a	 sharp	 decline	 in	 asset	 values	 led	 to	 balance	sheet	 contractions	 and	 a	 fire	 sale	 of	 assets,	 perpetuating	 a	 further	 decline	 in	 balance	sheets	which	resulted	in	a	vicious	downward	spiral.		While	this	dynamic	has	been	widely	studied,	the	effect	of	these	contractions	on	international	transmission	and	macroeconomic	activity	has	not	received	nearly	as	much	attention.	The	model	developed	by	Devereux	and	Yetman	allows	for	 financial	 frictions	or	distortions	in	credit	markets,	which	is	critical	when	evaluating	financial	meltdowns	like	 the	 one	 in	 2007.	 I	 describe	 the	 model	 in	 section	 3.	 Their	 focus	 is	 to	 compare	transmission	of	macro	shocks	across	countries	under	different	financial	structures	such	as	 segmented	 and	 integrated	 equity	 and	 bond	markets.	 They	 find	 that	 balance	 sheet	constraints	and	portfolio	interdependence	can	generate	statistically	significant	impulse	responses	in	both	home	and	foreign	countries.	The	model	draws	on	(Kiyotaki	&	Moore,	1997),	where	 leverage	 constraints	 are	 binding	 for	 the	 investors.	 The	 role	 of	 portfolio	links	 in	 cross-country	 contagion	 due	 to	 financial	 shocks	 is	 also	 well	 established.	(Rigobon,	2003)	(Pavlova	&	Rigobon,	2008)	The	most	salient	contribution	of	the	model	developed	 by	 Devereux	 is	 that	 it	 allows	 for	 endogenous	 portfolio	 interdependence.	(Devereux	 &	 Sutherland,	 Country	 portfolios	 in	 open	 economy	 macro	 models,	 2011)	
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They	 conclude	 that	 financial	 integration	 in	 both	 bond	 and	 equity	 markets	 generates	high	positive	co-movement	in	macro	variables	and	has	welfare	gains.	The	next	 step	 in	 refining	 this	model	 is	 to	evaluate	 results	during	expansionary	and	recessionary	phases	 in	a	business	cycle.	The	reasoning	being	 that	consumers	and	businesses	react	asymmetrically	to	a	shock	to	their	portfolio	depending	on	the	phase	of	the	business	cycle.	I	hypothesize	that	this	asymmetry	rests	on	the	assertion	that	people	react	 strongly	 when	 their	 portfolio	 loses	 value	 compared	 to	 an	 equivalent	 portfolio	increase.	One	can	argue	that	risk	averse	people	will	reduce	spending	by	a	larger	percent	with	a	 loss	 in	 income	than	they	will	 increase	spending	with	an	 increase	 in	 income.	To	this	effect	my	paper	adds	to	the	literature	in	a	few	different	ways.	Firstly,	I	add	a	source	of	shock	in	the	theoretical	model	that	is	attributed	to	the	financial	sector.	Devereux	and	Yetman	have	the	usual	productivity	shock	only.	This	provides	insights	into	the	impact	of	the	 financial	 sector	 on	 the	 macro	 economy.	 Secondly,	 I	 estimate	 the	 parameter	 that	differentiates	the	ability	for	investors	in	a	country	to	raise	capital	based	on	the	state	of	the	economy.	I	 find	that	during	recessions,	 investors	find	it	harder	to	raise	capital	but	Devereux	 and	 Yetman	 take	 this	 parameter	 to	 be	 fixed.	 A	 Markov-Switching	 regime	model	 provides	 an	 array	 of	 toolkits	 to	 generate	 this	 estimation.	 (Hamilton,	 1994)	(Hamiton,	 2005)	 In	 practice	 the	 two-step	 maximum	 likelihood	 estimation	 and	 a	MATLAB	 customizable	 package	 developed	 by	 Marcelo	 Perlin	 for	 regime	 switching	models	provide	the	statistical	basis	for	parameter.	(Perlin,	2015)		Regarding	 monetary	 neutrality	 tests,	 a	 series	 of	 empirical	 tests	 have	 been	designed	by	economists	to	test	for	long-run	effects	of	changes	in	money	supply.	Fisher	and	 Seater’s	 ARIMA	 and	 King	 and	 Watson’s	 VAR	 frameworks	 are	 among	 the	 most	widely	 used	 econometric	 tools	 to	 test	 LMN.	 (Fisher	&	 Seater,	 1993)	 (King	&	Watson,	1997).	Results	differ	 considerably	depending	on	data	 sources,	 aggregation	 techniques	
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and	 empirical	methods.	 Given	 the	 undisputed	 theoretical	 grounds	 for	 LMN,	 empirical	studies	 have	 been	 equally	 discouraging.	 Fisher	 and	 Seater	 (93)	 consider	 annual	 post	WWI	German	and	annual	U.S	data	 from	1869-1975	and	 find	 little	 support	 in	 favor	of	LMN	in	the	U.S	and	reject	LMSN	in	German	data.	Fisher	and	Seater’s	results	were	on	U.	S	data	 showed	 LMN	 by	 including	 dummy	 variables	 for	 the	 Great	 Depression	 period	(Boschen	&	Otrok,	1994).	King	and	Watson	used	post-war	U.S	data	and	found	evidence	in	support	of	LMN	and	inconclusive	evidence	for	LMSN.	2	Studies	of	LMN	and	LMSN	for	developing	 countries	 is	 even	 more	 inconclusive.	 Tests	 for	 LNM	 amongst	 African	countries	 found	 that	 money	 has	 significant	 positive	 lasting	 effects	 in	 the	 long	 run	(Ekomie	 &	 Jacques,	 2013).	 Tests	 for	Mexico	 between	 1932-1992	 supported	 the	 LNM	when	 a	 time	 dummy	was	 added	 for	 year	 domestic	 banks	 were	 nationalized	 in	 1982	(Wallace,	1999).	One	very	significant	test	in	favor	of	LNM	was	for	Turkey	(Sulku,	2011).	Using	Turkish	data	for	M1,	M2	and	M3	between	1987-2006,	she	found	LNM	to	hold	for	all	 monetary	 measures.	3	The	 results	 for	 LNM	 seem	 to	 vary	 based	 on	 monetary	aggregates	used,	countries,	aggregation	method	and	years	chosen.		The	 rest	 of	 the	 paper	 is	 organized	 as	 follows:	 Section	3	 develops	 the	 two-country	model	 along	with	 estimates	 from	 the	Markov	process	 to	 test	 for	 asymmetric	 effect	 of	financial	 integration	 on	 macro	 variables,	 Section	 4	 includes	 tests	 and	 results	 for	monetary	neutrality	and	section	5	concludes	this	paper.				
																																																																				2	Some	other	examples	of	studies	testing	for	LMN	and	LMSN	include	Weber	(1994),	Serletis	and	Koustas	(1998)	Leong	and	McAller	(2000),	Shelley	and	Wallace	(2006)		3	Studies	for	developing	countries	include	Bae	and	Ratti	(2000)	for	Argentina	and	Brazil,	Chen	(2007)	for	South	Korea	and	Taiwan	and	they	find	some	support	for	LNM.		
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CHAPTER	3:	ASYMMETRIC	EFFECT	OF	FINANCIAL	MARKET	INTEGRATION	ON						
																			BUSINESS	CYCLE	DYNAMICS	
	
3.1 	The	Model		In	 this	 section	 I	 describe	 a	 two-country	 Dynamic	 Stochastic	 General	 Equilibrium	model	(DSGE)	with	borrowers	and	lenders	in	each	country.	Countries	are	divided	into	home	 and	 foreign	 and	 are	 denoted	by	 the	 subscripts	 1	 and	2	 respectively.	 A	 variable	with	 an	 asterisk	 represents	 foreign	 countries’	 choices.	 For	 example,	𝑘,#- 	and	𝑘.#- 	represents	home	and	foreign	assets	held	by	home	investors	and	𝑘,,#-∗ 	and	𝑘.,#-∗ 	represents	home	 and	 foreign	 assets	 held	 by	 foreign	 investors.	 Within	 each	 country	 there	 are	investors	 and	 savers.	 This	 utilizes	 the	 two-country	 model	 developed	 by	 Michael	Devereux	 and	 James	 Yetman.	 (Devereux	 &	 Yetman,	 Leverage	 constraints	 and	 the	international	transmission	of	shocks,	2010)	Each	 country	has	 fixed	assets	 in	home	production	 for	each	period.	 Savers	own	the	 production	 resources	 and	 lend	 them	 to	 investors	 in	 each	 country.	 In	 return	investors	raise	capital	by	issuing	debt	to	the	savers.	Investors	purchase	the	fixed	assets	from	savers	and	rent	it	to	firms	that	produce	the	final	good,	thus	owning	equity	claims	in	 production	 firms.	 Investors	 finance	 through	 debt	 and	 own	 equity	 portfolio	 in	production	firms	that	are	interconnected	across	countries.	Savers	can	lend	to	investors	at	home	and	foreign	in	an	open	international	bond	market.	The	most	relevant	case	for	my	study	occurs	when	savers	can	lend	to	investors	in	both	countries	and	investors	can	lend	 to	 firms	 in	 both	 countries.	 These	 are	 the	 channels	 through	 which	 financial	integration	significantly	impacts	cross-country	output.	Investors	get	paid	a	risky	return	in	exchange.	This	framework	assumes	that	savers	are	more	patient	and	less	risky	than	investors.	 4 	(Devereux	 &	 Yetman,	 Leverage	 constraints	 and	 the	 international	
																																																																				4	Due	to	the	impatient	and	risky	nature,	investors	will	never	accumulate	enough	resources	to	cover	the	cost	of	investment	in	any	period	
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transmission	 of	 shocks,	 2010)	 (Devereux	 &	 Sutherland,	 Evaluating	 international	financial	integration	under	leverage	constraints,	2011)	Since	 investors	 are	 more	 risk	 prone	 than	 the	 savers,	 they	 face	 leverage	constraints	 in	 that	 the	maximum	amount	of	debt	 they	 can	 issue	depends	on	 their	net	worth.	They	can	trade	claims	with	foreign	investors	to	diversify	their	portfolio	of	equity	holdings.		Finally,	 both	 investors	 and	 savers	 supply	 labor	 resource	 inelastically	 to	 firms	that	 produce	 the	 final	 good.	 The	 model	 does	 not	 allow	 for	 endogenous	 capital	accumulation	 and	 variable	 labor	 supply.	 The	 focus	 of	 the	 paper	 by	 Devereux	 and	Yetman	was	 to	 jointly	analyze	how	binding	and	non-binding	 leverage	 constraints	and	international	portfolio	diversification	induce	shocks	across	countries.	The	focus	of	this	chapter	 is	 to	 analyze	 the	 asymmetric	 effect	 of	 shock	 propagation	 in	 financially	integrated	countries	on	macro	variables	in	home	and	foreign.	Therefore,	only	the	most	globally	integrated	version	of	their	model,	one	with	integrated	bond	and	equity	markets	and	where	leverage	constraints	are	binding,	is	relevant	to	my	analysis.		
3.2	Investors	
	Each	country	has	a	measure	of	n	investors	and	1	–	n	savers	where	the	population	is	normalized	to	unity.	The	representative	investor,	I	in	each	country	maximizes:		𝐸# 𝜃2-324# 𝑈 𝐶2- , 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒	𝑡ℎ𝑒	𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡	𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟	𝑖𝑠		𝜃2F,- = 𝛽- 𝐶2- 𝜃2-																														(1)																																																				𝐶2- 	is	consumption	of	the	final	good	by	the	investor.	Since	the	focus	of	this	paper	is	on	 international	 financial	 linkages	 I	 assume	 there	 to	be	one	world	good,	 as	did	 the	authors	whose	model	 I	 am	using.	 (Devereux	&	 Yetman,	 Leverage	 constraints	 and	 the	international	 transmission	 of	 shocks,	 2010)	 𝐶2- 	is	 the	 economy	 wide	 average	consumption	of	investors	and	𝛽-	′ 𝐶2- 	≤	0.	Hence	the	discount	factor	is	defined	such	that	
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the	rate	of	time	preference	is	increasing	in	consumption	of	the	average	investor	and	is	subject	to	diminishing	returns.5	The	investors	maximize	their	utility	function	subject	to	the	following	budget	constraints:			𝐶#- + 𝑞,#𝑘,#- + 𝑞.#𝑘.#- + 𝑅#K,𝐵#K,- = 𝑊#- + 𝑞,# + 𝑅,N# 𝑘,#K,- + 𝑞.# + 𝑅.N# 𝑘.#K,- + 𝐵#-						(2)							𝐵#- ≤ 𝜅# 𝑞,#𝑘,#- + 𝑞.#	𝑘.#- 	 																																																																																																										(3)				 where	 subscripts	 1	 and	 2	 denote	 home	 and	 foreign.	 The	 right-hand	 side	 of	equation	 (2)	 represents	 the	 source	 of	 income;	𝑊#- ,	 labor	 income	 from	 working	 in	domestic	 firms,	𝑞,#(𝑞.#),	 represents	 the	 price	 of	 equity	 assets	 in	 home	 (foreign),	𝑅,N#(𝑅.N#)	are	dividends	earned	from	holding	home	(foreign)	assets	𝑘,#K,- 	(𝑘.#K,- ),	that	were	 bought	 in	 the	 previous	 period.	 Lastly	 the	 investor	 raises	 capital	 by	 issuing	 new	debt	𝐵#- 	to	savers.		They	 spend	 their	 income	 on	 consumption,	𝐶#- ,	 home	 and	 foreign	 equity	 assets	from	final	goods	producing	firms	and	pay	back	previously	issued	debt	with	interest	to	the	savers.	As	 pointed	 out	 in	 the	 literature	 there	 is	 a	 reason	 why	 investors	 act	 as	 a	middleman	and	savers	cannot	directly	lend	to	firms.	(Bernanke,	Gertler,	&	Gilchrist,	The	financial	 accelerator	 in	 a	 quantitative	 business	 cycle	 framework,	 1999)	 (Bernanke	 &	Gertler,	 1999)	 (Devereux	&	 Yetman,	 2010)	 Investors	 specialize	 in	 transforming	 fixed	assets	 so	 they	 can	 be	 used	 by	 firms.	 Savers	 lend	 assets	 purely	 out	 of	 investment	purposes	and	gain	utility	from	those	returns	and	producing	home	goods.		Investors	 face	 another	 constraint	modelling	 their	 ability	 to	 raise	 debt	 given	 in	equation	 (3).	 Savers	will	 lend	based	on	 the	 ability	 of	 the	 investors	 to	 pay	back.	Total	debt	 cannot	 be	 larger	 than	𝜅	times	 the	 market	 value	 of	 current	 equity	 assets.	 The																																																																					5	In	a	model	with	different	kinds	of	consumers	within	and	across	countries	the	assumption	of	endogenous	time	preference	is	important	in	keeping	stationary	wealth	distribution.			
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investors’	value	of	assets	to	capital	ratio	or	full	leverage	rate	is	1/(1-	𝜅)	when	equation	(3)	 is	 binding.	 Equation	 (3)	 is	 a	 common	 way	 to	 model	 leverage	 constraints	 for	borrowers	in	both	closed	and	open	economies.	(Aiyagari	&	Gertler,	1999)	(Mendoza	&	Smith,	Quantitative	 implications	 of	 a	 debt-deflation	 theory	 of	 Sudden	 Stops	 and	 asset	prices,	2006)	(Uribe,	2006)	(Iacoviello,	2005)	(Kiyotaki	&	Moore,	1997)	𝜅	is	assumed	to	be	 a	 fixed	 parameter	 by	Devereux	 and	Yetman,	 but	 I	 treat	 it	 differently	 in	 two	ways.	First,	 instead	of	treating	it	as	a	fixed	parameter,	 I	estimate	it	based	on	the	state	of	the	economy.	 My	 reasoning	 is	 that	 during	 recessions	 investors	 find	 it	 harder	 to	 borrow,	making	𝜅	a	 smaller	 number.	 In	 turn	 this	 reduces	 funds	 available	 for	 final	 goods	producing	 firms	 and	 further	 contracts	 the	 economy.	 The	 opposite	 is	 true	 during	economic	 expansions.	 I	 incorporate	 a	 Markov	 Switching	 Regime	 change	 to	 estimate	parameter	𝜅	using	techniques	developed	by	others.	 (Hamilton,	1994)	(Hamiton,	2005)	(Perlin,	 2015)	Thus,	 there	will	 be	 two	values	 for	 the	 leverage	 rate	 for	 investors.	 This	process	is	described	in	section	5.	Second,	in	addition	to	the	usual	productivity	shock,	I	include	an	extra	source	of	 shock	 in	 this	model	emanating	 from	𝜅,	which	differentiates	the	ability	of	investors	to	borrow.	This	shock	follows	an	AR	process.	This	can	be	thought	of	as	a	proxy	for	a	shock	to	the	financial	sector.				The	investor	will	maximize	(1)	subject	to	(2)	and	(3).	The	FOC’s	are	summarized	in	Appendix	A.	Combining	the	FOC’s,	one	can	derive	the	optimal	portfolio	selection	for	investors.			𝐸#𝑈Q 𝐶#F,- RSTUS	F	VSWTUSRST 	− 	RXTUS	F	VXTUSRXT = 0	 	 																																					(4)	and	(I-9)																		 Equation	 (4)	 is	 used	 to	 determine	 the	 optimal	 equity	 portfolio	 for	 investors	between	 home	 and	 foreign	 investments.	 To	 obtain	 a	 unique	 solution	 for	 the	 optimal	equity	portfolio	 requires	a	 little	more	consideration.	The	usual	 linear	 solution	around	
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the	 steady	 state	 leaves	 the	 investor	 indifferent	 between	 choosing	 home	 and	 foreign	equity.	 I	 use	 the	 techniques	 developed	 in	 a	 different	 paper	 to	 solve	 for	 optimal	portfolios	(Devereux	&	Sutherland,	Country	portfolios	in	open	economy	macro	models,	2011).	I	lay	out	the	solution	methodology	in	section	3.6.	Following	trade	literature,	it	is	useful	 to	 add	 transactions	 costs	 for	 international	 financial	 trade.	 Following	 (Tille	 &	Wincoop,	 2007)	 an	 ‘iceberg’	 cost,	exp	(−𝜏),	 is	 added	 to	 the	 term	 in	 equation	 (4)	 that	represents	foreign	equity	purchased	by	home	investor.	Equation	(4)	becomes:			𝐸#𝑈Q 𝐶#F,- RSTUS	F	VSWTUSRST 	− 	RXTUS	F	VXTUSRXT exp	(−𝜏) = 0	 	 	 																				 (4’)																							where	exp	(−𝜏) 	≤ 1.	Even	though	transactions	costs	associated	with	foreign	purchases	are	 more	 prevalent	 when	 buying	 physical	 goods,	 fees	 involved	 in	 trading	 purely	financial	transactions	are	worth	incorporating.	(Tille	&	Wincoop,	2007)	and	(Devereux	&	 Yetman,	 Leverage	 constraints	 and	 the	 international	 transmission	 of	 shocks,	 2010)	assume	𝜏	to	be	small	and	a	second	order	term.	The	fact	that	it	is	less	than	one	does	not	impact	 the	 first	 order	dynamics	of	 the	model	 except	 the	portfolio	 choice	of	 investors.	Like	 the	 authors	 above,	 I	 set	 the	 transactions	 cost	 to	 ensure	 that	 domestic	 investors	hold	75	percent	of	home	equity	portfolios.	When	analyzing	the	shocks	to	the	economy,	I	calculate	the	impulse	responses	for	both	cases;	𝜏 = 0	and	when	𝜏 > 0.		
3.3	Savers		Savers’	are	modeled	by	the	utility	function			𝐸# 𝜃2]324# 𝑈 𝐶2] ,				𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒	𝜃2F,] = 𝛽] 𝐶2] 𝜃2]																																																																																(5)		
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Like	for	the	investor	the	model	assumes	𝛽]	′ 𝐶2] ≤	0	and	𝐶2]	is	the	economy	wide	aggregate	 consumption	 of	 savers.	 To	 differentiate	 the	 fact	 that	 savers	 are	 inherently	more	patient	than	investors	in	terms	of	risk	taking,	the	model	assumes			𝛽] 𝑥 > 𝛽- 𝑥 	for	all	values	of	𝑥																																																																																																						(6)		 Savers	 buy	 some	 of	 the	 fixed	 assets	 from	 the	 market	 and	 buy	 debt	 from	investors.	They	supply	labor	in	the	final	goods	market	and	earn	wealth	from	wages,	and	their	 returns	 on	 investment.	 Some	 of	 the	 fixed	 asset,	𝑘,#] ,	 bought	 by	 savers	 is	 used	 in	home	production,	𝐺 𝑘,#K,] 	which	is	subject	to	diminishing	returns.	The	model	assumes	a	saver	to	be	indifferent	between	consumption	of	final	good	and	buying	fixed	asset	for	home	 production.	 These	 are	 perfect	 substitutes.	 Hence	 the	 budget	 constraint	 for	 the	savers	is	as	follows:	𝐶#] + 𝑞,#k,#] = 𝑊#] + 𝑞,#	𝑘,#K,] + 𝐺 𝑘,#K,] + Β#] − 𝐵#K,] 𝑅#K,																																																			(7)												Savers	do	not	have	access	to	the	same	investment	opportunities	as	the	investors	and	only	buy	domestic	fixed	assets.	FOC’s	are	in	Appendix	A.	
3.4	Production	Firms	
	Profit	 maximizing	 final	 goods	 producing	 firms	 hire	 labor	 and	 fixed	 assets	 as	inputs	 and	 operate	 in	 a	 competitive	 environment.	 The	 production	 function	 takes	 the	form:	𝑌# = 𝐴#𝐹 𝐿#	, 𝐾#K, 																																																																																																																																(8)																																						where		𝐾#K, = 𝑛(𝑘,#K,- + 𝑘,,#K,-∗ )																																																																																																						(9)																																			represents	total	use	of	fixed	asset	in	home	final	goods	production	and	are	constrained				by	𝑊#𝐿# + 𝑅,,N,#𝐾#K, ≤ 	𝑃#𝑌#																																																																																																											(10)																															
3.5	Equilibrium		
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In	a	two-country	world,	the	market	clearing	exists	in	the	market	for	the	fixed	asset	as	well	as	the	debt	market.	In	a	world	with	a	common	bond	market:			𝑛 𝐵#- + 𝐵#-∗ + 1 − 𝑛 𝐵#] + 𝐵#]∗ = 0																			 	 	 													 																									(11)																												where	the	total	debt	issued	by	home	and	foreign	investors	must	equal	total	debt	held	by	home	and	foreign	savers	for	any	time-period	t.	The	equilibrium	for	the	fixed	asset	is	where	for	each	country	the	total	amount	of	fixed	assets	is	held	between	domestic	and	foreign	investors	and	domestic	savers	(for	home	production).		𝑛𝑘,,#- + 𝑛𝑘,,#-∗ + 1 − 𝑛 𝑘,,#] = 1																											 																																																																		(12)																													 	 	 																										where	𝑘,,#-∗ 	represents	the	real	holding	of	home	assets	by	foreign	country	investors’	at	time	𝑡 + 1.	The	world	clearing	is	then	represented	by:		𝑛 𝐶#- + 𝐶#-∗ + 1 − 𝑛 𝐶#] + 𝐶#]∗ = 𝐴#	𝐹(1, 𝑛(𝑘,,#K,- + 𝑘,,#K,-∗ )) + 𝐴#∗	𝐹 1, 𝑛 𝑘.,#K,- +𝑘.,#K,-∗ + 1 − 𝑛 𝐺 𝑘,,#K,] + 𝐺(𝑘.,#K,]∗ ) 																																																																																													(13)			Equation	 13	 implies	 the	 following;	worldwide	 consumption	 equals	 final	 goods	and	home	good	production,	 total	 labor	supplied	by	savers	and	investors	sum	to	unity,	resources	 (fixed	 factor)	 used	 by	 final	 goods	 producing	 firms	 equals	 the	 holdings	 by	home	 and	 foreign	 investors.	 (Devereux	 &	 Yetman,	 Leverage	 constraints	 and	 the	international	transmission	of	shocks,	2010)	They	have	four	variants	to	their	paper;	first	two	has	a	world	with	segmented	bond	and	integrated	equity	markets	with	and	without	binding	 leverage	 constraints,	 third	 and	 fourth	 has	 an	 international	 integrated	 bond	market	 with	 binding	 leverage	 constraints	 with	 and	 without	 integration	 of	 equity	markets.	The	variant	with	one	 international	bond	market	has	a	single	 interest	rate	on	bonds.	 In	 this	 paper,	 I	 work	 with	 the	 case	 where	 bond	 and	 equity	 markets	 are	
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integrated	 and	 leverage	 constraint	 is	 binding.	 This	 represents	 full	 portfolio	diversification	 and	 is	 the	 ideal	 setting	 to	 test	 my	 theory	 whether	 cross-country	correlation	is	stronger	during	recessions.		The	equilibrium	conditions	are	described	by	two	sets	of	equations	2,	3,	7,12,	I-6,	
I-7,	 I-8,	S-5,	S-6,	F-1,	F-2.	 One	 that	 represents	 the	 outcome	 for	 home	 and	 another	 for	foreign.	Additionally,	 there	 a	 single	 global	 equation	11	and	13	 that	 correspond	 to	 the	global	supply	of	debt	and	fixed	assets.	This	gives	us	24	equations	in	23	variables	𝐶#-	,	𝐶#],	𝐶#-∗ ,	𝐶#]∗ ,	𝑘,,#- 	,	𝑘,,#] 	,	𝑘.,#-∗ 	,	𝑘.,#]∗ 	,	𝑘,,#-∗ 	,	𝑘.,#- 	,	𝐵#- 	,	𝐵#] ,	𝐵#-∗ ,	𝐵#]∗ ,	𝑞,,# 	,	𝑞.,# 	,	𝑊# 	,	𝑊#∗ 	,	𝑅# 	,	𝑅,N,# 	,	𝑅.N,#	,	𝜇#	,	𝜇#∗	.	 Linear	 approximation	 around	 the	non-stochastic	 steady	 state	 solves	 the	model.	However,	 as	 pointed	 out	 earlier	 in	 section	 3.2	 there	 is	 a	 known	 problem	 in	determining	optimal	portfolio	 choice	 in	 open-economy	models	with	 integrated	 equity	markets.	When	equity	holdings	are	traded	across	countries,	steady	state	representation	does	not	help	determine	the	optimal	portfolio	in	home	and	foreign	equity.	This	occurs	because	the	investor	is	indifferent	between	home	and	foreign	equity	in	a	non-stochastic	steady	state	due	to	identical	returns	from	home	and	foreign	equity	in	equilibrium.	I	use	the	method	developed	in	another	paper	by		(Devereux	&	Sutherland,	Country	portfolios	in	open	economy	macro	models,	2011)	and	(Devereux	&	Sutherland,	Country	Portfolio	Dynamics,	2010)	to	approximate	the	equilibrium	portfolio.	They	develop	the	technique	by	which	a	unique	solution	to	the	portfolio	choice	is	made.	This	method	uses	a	second	order	 approximation	 of	 the	 portfolio	 equation	 (4)	 or	 (4’)	 along	 with	 the	 first	 order	approximation	of	the	rest	of	the	model	to	develop	the	steady	state	conditions.	Then	one	can	study	how	the	stochastic	structure	of	the	model	determines	the	portfolio	allocation	along	with	 the	 economy’s	 response	 to	 stochastic	 shocks.	 The	 equilibrium	 of	 the	 two-country	model	determines	the	distribution	of	consumption,	distribution	as	assets,	asset	
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prices,	 interest	 rate,	 equity	 and	 debt	 holdings.	 The	 detail	 of	 this	 methodology	 is	described	in	section	3.7.	
3.6	Steady	State	
	Combining	equations	I-6,	I-8,	S-5,	S-6	and	F-2	gives	us	the	steady	state	condition	to	ensure	that	fixed	assets	are	allocated	efficiently	between	home	production	and	final	goods	producing	firms:	
𝐺Q 𝑘,] = jk ,Kjljl ,Kjk Km(jlKjk) 𝐴𝐹.(𝐿, 𝑛𝑘#-)											 	 	 	 																									(14)		where	𝑛𝑘#- 	is	the	total	quantity	of	the	fixed	asset	used	by	firms	in	the	production	of	final	goods.	𝑘,- = 𝑘,- + 𝑘,-∗ 	is	 the	 sum	 of	 home	 fixed	 assets	 owned	 by	 home	 and	 foreign	investors.	 Finally,	𝑛𝑘,- + 1 − 𝑛 𝑘,] = 1 .	 Equation	 (14)	 ensures	 that	 the	 marginal	product	of	the	asset	used	in	home	production	and	final	goods	production	are	equal.	The	binding	 restriction	 on	 how	 much	 debt	 investors	 can	 raise	 in	 equation	 (3)	 and	 their	inherent	 impatience	 in	 equation	 (6)	 implies	 that	𝛽- 1 − 𝛽] [𝛽] 1 − 𝛽- − 𝜅(𝛽]−𝛽-)] < 1.	When	 investors	 can	 trade	 freely	 in	 equities	between	 countries,	 the	 returns	 to	 must	 equalize	 across	 countries.	 And	 since	 the	discount	 factors	 are	 endogenously	 determined	 and	 impact	 consumption	 behavior,	returns	 for	 investors	with	 trade	 in	equities	will	 inherently	 interact	with	consumption.	Equation	(14)	encompasses	that	link	and	implies	that	division	of	assets	between	home	and	final	goods	production	will	be	linked	across	countries	as	well.	Productivity	shocks	to	one	country	will	affect	the	tightness	of	leverage	constraints	across	home	and	foreign	which	in	turn	would	impact	output	levels	across	countries.				
3.7	Optimal	Portfolio	Choice	and	solution	to	the	model	
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The	steady	state	allocation	of	the	fixed	asset	given	by	equation	14	determines	the	supply	of	equity	in	each	country.	Using	the	method	in	(Devereux	&	Sutherland,	Country	portfolios	in	open	economy	macro	models,	2011),	described	in	this	section,	I	determine	the	share	of	each	country’s	equity	held	by	home	and	foreign	investors	(𝑘,- ,	𝑘,-∗, 𝑘.- ,	𝑘.-∗);	where	 the	 measure	 of	 total	 equity	 issued	 by	 home	 country	 and	 held	 by	 home	 and	foreign	investors	is		𝑘#- = 𝑘#- + 𝑘#-∗	 	 	 	 	 						 									 	 	 																									(15)										 To	 represent	 the	 net	 international	 position	 of	 investors	 (since	 only	 investors	have	 access	 to	 foreign	 equity),	𝑟q# = 𝑟,# − 𝑟.# ,	 the	 equation	 representing	 the	 budget	constraint	for	investors	(2)	can	be	rewritten	as:	𝐶#- + 𝑁𝐹𝐴# = 𝑊#- + 𝑅,N#𝑘,#K,- − 𝑞,# 𝑘,#- −𝑘,#K,- + 𝑟.#𝑁𝐹𝐴#K, + 𝑟q# 𝑞,#K, 𝑘,#K,- −𝑘,#K,- + 𝐵#- − 𝑅#K,𝐵#K,- 		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 												(16)				 																										where	net	foreign	asset,	𝑁𝐹𝐴# = 𝑞.#𝑘.#- − 𝑞,#(𝑘,#- − 𝑘,#- )		 	 	 												(17)	 																										𝑟,# = RST	F	VSW,TRSTsS 			NFA	represents	a	country’s	net	 foreign	assets,	or	home	investor’s	ownership	 in	foreign	 equity	 relative	 to	 foreign	 investor’s	 ownership	 in	 home	 assets.	𝑟q,#measures	excess	 return	 on	 home	 assets.	 The	 benefit	 of	 writing	 the	 budget	 constraint	 for	 the	investor	 as	 equation	 (16)	 is	 that	 the	 term	𝑞,#K, 𝑘,#K,- − 𝑘,#K,- 	describes	 the	portfolio	choice	for	a	given	NFA.	Define	𝛼# = 𝑞,#K, 𝑘,#K,- − 𝑘,#K,- 	 	 	 	 	 	 																																							(18)								to	represent	the	net	holding	of	home	equity	by	home	investors.	If	no	trade	in	equity	is	allowed	and	home	owners	held	all	the	home	equity,	𝛼#	would	be	zero.	Conversely,	if	𝛼#	is	negative,	it	means	home	investors	own	less	than	100	percent	of	all	home	equity	and	
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foreign	 investors	 own	 the	 remaining.	𝑁𝐹𝐴# − 𝛼#	would	 then	measure	 home	 investor’s	holding	of	foreign	equity.	In	this	model	only	equation	(16)	has	the	term	for	the	optimal	portfolio,	𝛼# ,	present	and	the	solution	to	which	is	obtained	by	taking	the	second	order	approximation	of	equation	 (4)	or	 (4’).	 Substituting	𝑁𝐹𝐴#	and	𝑘,#- 	into	equation	 (3),	we	get;	𝐵#- ≤ 𝜅 𝑁𝐹𝐴# + 𝑞,#	𝑘,#- 	 																																																																																																																			(19)																																Thus,	an	increase	in	net	foreign	asset,	𝑁𝐹𝐴# ,	will	 loosen	the	leverage	constraint	for	 home	 investors.	 But	 since	𝑁𝐹𝐴# + 𝑁𝐹𝐴#∗ = 0,	 the	 leverage	 constraint	 for	 foreign	investors	will	 simultaneously	 tighten.	To	 that	affect	 the	degree	 to	which	 international	linkages	 impact	 the	 transmission	 of	 shocks	 depends	 on	 the	 dynamics	 of	 net	 foreign	assets	 held,	which	 in	 turn	 are	 dependent	 on	portfolio	 choices,	𝛼# ,	made	by	 home	 and	foreign	investors.		Next	I	describe	the	solution	method	used	in	this	paper.	To	solve	a	DSGE	model,	one	 takes	 a	 linear	 approximation	 around	 the	 steady	 state	 of	 the	 model.	 However,	models	 with	 international	 portfolios	 do	 not	 have	 a	 unique	 steady	 state	 because	 first	order	 conditions	 lead	 the	 investor	 to	 treat	 home	 and	 foreign	 assets	 as	 perfect	substitutes.	I	use	the	typical	method	to	solve	for	DSGE	models	for	equations	2,	3,	7,	12,	I-8,	S-5,	S-6,	F-1,	F-2	for	home	and	foreign,	a	single	global	equation	11	and	13	and	use	the	method	in	(Devereux	&	Sutherland,	Country	portfolios	in	open	economy	macro	models,	2011)	to	solve	for	equation	(4)	or	(4’)	and	obtain	the	optimal	portfolio,	𝛼#	.	This	is	done	by	 combining	 a	 second	 order	 approximation	 of	 (4’)	 along	 with	 the	 first	 order	approximation	 of	 the	 rest	 of	 the	 equations.	 One	 must	 look	 at	 second	 order	approximation	when	 looking	 at	 international	 portfolios	 because	 up	 to	 the	 first	 order,	investors	 are	 indifferent	 between	 home	 and	 foreign	 assets.	 Thus,	 portfolio	 allocation	
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depends	only	on	variance	covariance	of	asset	returns,	which	show	up	only	in	the	second	order	components	of	optimality	conditions.			I	 use	 Uhlig’s	 method	 to	 take	 the	 second	 order	 approximation	 (Uhlig,	 1999)	(McCandless,	 2008)	 For	 a	 set	 of	 variables	𝑋# ,	 define	𝑋# = 𝑙𝑛 𝑋# − 𝑙𝑛(𝑋)	to	 be	 the	difference	 between	 a	 variable	 from	 its	 steady	 state.	 Then	 rewrite	𝑋# = 𝑋𝑒wT 	.	 After	writing	all	variables	 in	this	 form,	take	the	Taylor	expansion	around	of	the	exponential	term	around	its	stationary	value.	Thus,	the	second	order	Taylor	expansion	of	equations	𝐸#𝑈Q 𝐶#F,- 𝑟,#F, − 𝑟.#F, = 0 	and	 𝐸#𝑈Q 𝐶#F,-∗ 𝑟,#F, − 𝑟.#F, = 0 ,	 𝑟q# = 𝑟,# − 𝑟.# 	gives	us:			𝐸# 𝑟q,#F, + ,. 𝑟,,#F,. − 𝑟.,#F,. − 𝑈Q 𝐶#F, 𝑟q,#F, = 0																																																																(20)		𝐸# 𝑟q,#F, + ,. 𝑟,,#F,. − 𝑟.,#F,. − 𝑈Q 𝐶∗#F, 𝑟q,#F, = 0																																																														(21)		Combining	(20)	and	(21)	yields					𝐸# 	 𝑈Q 𝐶#F, − 𝑈Q 𝐶∗#F, 	𝑟q,#F, = 0																					 	 	 	 																									(22)		and	𝐸# 𝑟q,#F, = − ,. 𝐸# 𝑟,,#F,. − 𝑟.,#F,. + ,. 𝐸# 𝑈Q 𝐶#F, + 𝑈Q 𝐶∗#F, 𝑟q,#F, 														(23)		(Devereux	 &	 Sutherland,	 Country	 portfolios	 in	 open	 economy	 macro	 models,	 2011)	show	that	equations	(22)	and	(23)	are	sufficient	to	derive	the	optimal	portfolio	choice	for	investors,	𝛼# .		Having	 a	 unique	 solution	 to	 all	 parts	 of	 the	 model,	 I	 solve	 the	 state	 space	representation	of	the	model	using	Sims	solution	method.		
3.8 		Calibration,	Estimation	and	Functional	form	
	The	 goal	 of	 this	 chapter	 is	 to	 explore	 how	 international	 financial	 portfolio	interdependence	affects	cross-country	macro	variables	under	the	different	phases	of	a	business	 cycle.	 The	 macro	 variables	 to	 consider	 are	 asset	 prices,	 asset	 allocations,	levered	 investments.	 In	 this	 section	 I	 lay	 out	 the	 parameterization	 of	 the	 model.	 I	
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employ	the	parameters	commonly	used	in	open	economy	models	rather	than	estimating	it	 from	the	data	generating	process.	Even	 though	calibration	might	be	 less	 reliable,	 in	the	case	of	my	model	there	are	far	too	many	variables	to	get	accurate	data	for	multiple	countries	 to	 be	 able	 to	 estimate	 the	 parameters.	 Table	 4	 provides	 the	 calibrated	parameters.		
Table	4:	Calibrated	parameters			
Parameter	 Value	𝑛	 Proportion	of	investors	 .5	1 − 𝑛	 Proportion	of	savers	 .5	𝜁- 	 Discount	function,	Investors	 0.99	𝜁]	 Discount	function,	Savers	 0.955	𝜂	 Discount	function	 0.022	𝜎	 Coefficient	of	relative	risk	aversion	 2	𝜀	 Share	of	capital	in	final	goods	production	 0.39	1 − 	𝜀	 Share	of	labor	in	final	goods	production	 0.64	𝜔	 Share	of	capital	in	home	production	 0.1	𝜅	 Leverage,	See	section	5		 0.28,	0.791	𝜌	 Productivity	shock	persistence	 0.9	𝜑	 Financial	sector,	de-leveraging	shock	persistence	 0.9	
	Having	 equal	 number	 of	 savers	 and	 investors	 where	 investors	 face	 leverage	constraints	is	taken	from	the	estimates	from	U.S	economy	(Campbell	&	Mankiw,	1990).	The	discount	factor,	𝛽 ,	for	investors	and	savers	has	the	functional	form;	𝛽 𝐶 = 𝜁 1 + 𝐶 K, 𝑖 = 	𝐼, 𝑆 	where	 𝜂 	is	 chosen	 to	 be	 0.022	 (Mendoza	 &	 Smith,	Quantitative	 implications	of	 a	debt-deflation	 theory	of	 Sudden	Stops	 and	asset	prices,	2006)	and	(Mendoza,	2006)	𝜁	should	be	defined	differently	for	savers	and	investors	to	represent	 their	 difference	 in	 patience.	 For	 savers,	 it	 is	 chosen	 to	 match	 an	 annual	interest	rate	of	4	percent	and	for	investors	it	is	chosen	to	reflect	an	interest	premium	on	borrowed	funds	of	2	percent.	This	premium	on	investors	matches	the	typical	spread	on	corporate	 debt.	 (Bernanke,	 Gertler,	 &	 Gilchrist,	 The	 financial	 accelerator	 in	 a	quantitative	business	cycle	framework,	1999)		
		
28	
The	value	for	 leverage	constraint,	𝜅,	has	 important	quantitative	 implications	on	the	model.	Total	investment	relative	to	capital	or	total	leverage	ratio	is	1/(1-	𝜅).	There	are	 two	 alternatives	 that	 I	 analyze	 for	𝜅;	 one	 during	 a	 recession	 and	 another	 during	expansions.	 I	 estimate	 the	 parameter,	𝜅	during	 the	 two	 regimes	 using	 a	 markov	switching	model	using	data	for	U.S	from	1995-2012	(Hamiton,	2005)	(Hamilton,	1994).	This	 is	 done	 in	 section	 5.	 The	 estimate	 during	 recessions	 is	 0.28	 and	 0.79	 during	expansions.	 Devereux	 and	 Yetman	 use	 the	 value	 of	0.5 	following	 other	 studies	(Bernanke	 &	 Gertler,	 1999).	 But	 given	 that	 investors	 enjoyed	 high	 leverage	 in	 years	prior	 to	 the	2007	crisis,	 I	 look	at	both	possibilities.	 I	would	expect	 that	 the	 case	with	high	leverage,	shocks	would	have	a	larger	impact.			The	 utility	 function	 has	 the	 function	 form	𝑈 𝐶 = Ss,K 	with	 elasticity	 of	substitution	equaling	0.5	implying	relative	risk	aversion,	𝜎 = 2.		The	 production	 function	 is	 a	 typical	 Cobb-Douglas	 function	 with	 technology:	𝐹 𝐿, 𝐾 = 𝐴	𝐿,K𝐾 ,	 where	 the	 share	 of	 capital	 is	 chosen	 using	 the	 conventional	economic	 measure	 of	 0.36,	 which	 matches	 the	 percent	 of	 capital	 in	 GDP	 for	 G-7	countries.	The	home	production	sector	is	represented	by	𝐺 𝑘] = 𝑍 𝑘,]  .	The	share	of	fixed	assets	used	in	a	country	is	more	heavily	used	by	the	final	goods	producing	firms.	(Benhabib,	 Rogerson,	 &	 Wright,	 1991)	 calibrated	 the	 share	 of	 capital	 in	 home	production	to	be	0.09.	In	this	paper,	in	steady	state,	90	percent	of	the	fixed	assets	in	a	country	are	used	in	final	goods	production.		Finally,	there	are	two	shocks	experienced	by	both	countries.	First	shock	from	the	standard	macro	business	cycle	literature	emanates	from	productivity	shocks	in	the	final	goods	sector.	The	stochastic	process	for	the	above	shock	is:	log(𝐴#) = 𝜌 log(𝐴#K,) + 𝜐#																												 	 	 	 	 																									(24)	
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where	𝜌 = 0.9,	 and	 the	 error	 term	 has	 mean	 zero	 and	 variance	 0.005	 (Devereux	 &	Sutherland,	 2011)	 (Jermann	&	Quadrini,	 2009,	 2012)	 Jermann	 and	Quadrini	 estimate	the	variance	in	productivity	shocks	in	the	U.S	economy	over	the	sample	1984-2009.	During	 the	 financial	 crisis	 of	 2007,	 it	 was	 apparent	 that	 the	 shocks	 to	 the	countries	 were	 to	 the	 financial	 sector	 itself.	 (Kollman,	 Enders,	 &	 Mueller,	 2011)	 In	response	 to	 risky	 behavior,	 bank	 portfolios	 deteriorated	 leading	 to	 de-leveraging	amongst	 investors.	 In	 this	model,	 a	 negative	 shock	 to	 the	 variable	𝜅	could	 represents	forced	de-leveraging	by	investors.	A	shock	to	𝜅	can	be	thought	as	borrower	or	investor	specific	 and	 constraints	 the	 ability	 of	 investors	 to	 borrow.	 This	 enables	 one	 to	 study	responses	 in	 an	 economy	 emanating	 directly	 from	 the	 financial	 sector.	 This	 is	 useful	since	productivity	 shocks	 effect	 the	 financial	 and	non-financial	 sector	 simultaneously.	That	makes	it	hard	to	understand	whether	the	effects	on	consumption	and	investment	are	directly	 from	productivity	or	a	 lagged	effect	of	productivity	on	 financial	 links.	The	shock	process	to	the	financial	sector	follows:	ln(𝜅#) = 𝜑 ln(𝜅#K,) + 𝜀#																				 	 	 	 	 																																							(25)	
	with	𝜀#	~	𝑁(0, 𝜎#.),	 where	𝜎#. = 0.011.	following	 (Jermann	 &	 Quadrini,	 2009,	 2012),	who	estimate	the	standard	deviation	of	financial	shock.		
3.9 	Markov	Switching	Regime	
	 An	important	contribution	of	my	paper	is	to	test	whether	macro	variables	have	a	stronger	correlation	during	economic	recessions	than	expansions.	The	model	laid	out	in	(Devereux	 &	 Yetman,	 Leverage	 constraints	 and	 the	 international	 transmission	 of	shocks,	 2010)	 provides	 a	 useful	 environment	 to	 test	 my	 theory.	 Now	 that	 I	 have	summarized	the	appropriate	parts	of	that	model,	I	can	test	the	impact	of	balance	sheet	contractions	on	countries	during	the	two	phases	of	a	business	cycle.	I	use	the	parameter	𝜅	in	 equation	 3	 to	 explicitly	 incorporate	 recessions	 and	 expansions	 into	 the	model.	𝜅	
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represents	 leverage	 constraints	 faced	 by	 investors	 and	 ensures	 that	 investors	 can	borrow	some	percent	of	the	value	of	their	assets.	This	lowers	the	ability	of	investors	to	issue	 bonds	without	 any	 risk	 consequence.	 This	 ability	must	 be	more	 limiting	 during	recessions	 for	 the	 following	 reasons.	First,	 savers	will	want	 to	hold	on	 to	 safer	assets	even	 at	 the	 cost	 of	 lower	 returns	 due	 to	 the	 uncertainty	 in	 the	 economy.	 Due	 to	increased	 unemployment,	 they	will	 not	 be	 looking	 for	 new	 investment	 opportunities.	This	 is	 especially	 true	 amongst	 risk	 averse	 savers.	 Second,	 lower	 interest	 rates	 by	central	 bankers	 during	 recessions	 would	 lower	 investment	 opportunities	 in	 the	economy	 in	 general.	 These	 reasons	 would	 ensure	 that	 investors	 will	 not	 be	 able	 to	leverage	 out	 their	 capital	 as	 much.	 The	 reverse	 would	 be	 true	 during	 expansionary	phase.			I	 employ	 a	 markov-switching	 regime	 to	 estimate	 this	 effect.	 This	 technique	enables	 me	 to	 incorporate	 the	 two	 phases	 of	 the	 business	 cycles	 by	 estimating	 two	values	for	leverage	ratio.	Since	𝜅	impacts	investors	directly,	I	can	then	analyze	the	effect	of	 a	 shock	 to	𝜅	on	 home	 and	 foreign	 country	 during	 the	 two	 regimes	 of	 the	 model,	business	expansions	and	contractions.	Consider	equation	(26):		𝜅# = 𝛽 + 𝛽,𝑆#𝑍# + 𝛽. 𝜅#K, +𝛽𝑋#K, + 𝜀#				 	 	 						 												(26)					𝜀#	~	𝑁(0, 𝜎2#. )			where	𝜅#	represents	the	leverage	ratio	in	period	𝑡	of	bank	𝑖	headquartered	in	country	𝑗.	 This	 ratio	 is	measured	 as	 the	 ratio	 of	 Tier	 1	 capital	 to	 total	 assets	 of	 banks.	 Tier	 1	capital	 is	 the	 bank’s	 core	 capital	 as	 defined	 by	 the	 Basel	 III	 accord,	 which	 is	 the	international	 regulatory	 accord	 designed	 to	 supervise	 bank	 risk.	 It	 includes	shareholders’	 equity	 and	 retained	 earnings.	 The	 lagged	 term	 for	 leverage	 ratio	
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represents	short	term	adjustments	costs	for	banks	arising	from	rigidities	in	the	capital	markets.	 Such	 rigidities	make	 it	 hard	 for	 them	 to	 raise	 capital	 at	 short	 notice	 due	 to	negative	capital	shocks.	(Myers	&	Majluf,	1984)	 	The	coefficient	on	this	term	is	what	I	estimate	to	be	the	leverage	constraint	parameter,	𝜅	for	the	model	in	previous	sections.	Using	 the	 coefficient	 on	 the	 lagged	 variable	 makes	 sense	 since	 most	 borrowing	 has	already	happened	when	 the	 economy	goes	 into	 a	 recession.	Bond	market	 loans	 takes	time	to	reach	maturity	and	a	lag	of	one	period	gives	savers	and	investors	time	to	adjust	their	behavior.	Thus,	 if	 after	a	 loan	matures,	 savers	do	not	wish	 to	 renew	 their	 loans,	they	can	choose	not	to.			Variable	𝑍# 	is	 the	 measure	 for	 real	 GDP	 for	 the	 U.S.	𝑆# 	is	 the	 switching	parameter,	taking	on	a	value	of	0	if	the	economy	is	in	the	state	of	a	recession	and	1	for	expansions.	 I	 use	 the	NBER	data	 to	 determine	 the	 state	 of	 the	U.S.	 economy	between	1995-2012.	Ideally,	I	would	like	to	include	data	for	the	two	states	for	all	countries,	but	that	is	not	possible	given	the	two	states	do	not	necessarily	coincide	every	year	for	every	pair	of	country.	However,	since	U.S	is	typically,	and	certainly	during	the	2007	crisis,	the	biggest	source	of	 financial	turmoil	that	propagates	globally,	 it	proves	useful	to	use	U.S	business	 cycles	 to	 estimate	 the	 transition	 matrix.	 Lastly,	𝑋#K,	is	 a	 vector	 with	 bank	specific	 characteristics	 like	 bank	 size	 (log	 of	 total	 bank	 assets)	 and	 bank	 profitability	(return	on	assets,	ROA).	Defining	𝑋#K,to	isolate	bank	specific	characteristics	is	used	by	other	authors	as	well.	(Ayuso,	Perez,	&	Jesus,	2004)	(Gropp	&	Heider,	2009).				𝑧# = 	∆ln	(𝑦#) = 𝑙𝑛	𝑦#−𝑙𝑛	𝑦#K,	is	 the	 transformation	 of	 output	 into	 its	 first	 logged	difference	to	adjust	for	the	unit	root	observed	in	annual	output	data.	Unit	root	tests	and	data	details	and	characteristics	are	presented	in	appendix	B.	ADF	and	PP	unit	root	tests	reject	the	presence	of	unit	root	in	either	data	after	appropriately	adjusting	the	data.	The	years	are	chosen	to	encompass	multiple	business	cycles	across	the	countries.	I	estimate	
		
32	
the	parameters	using	maximum	likelihood	procedure,	which	takes	on	the	log	likelihood	function:	𝑙𝑛 𝐿 = 𝑙𝑛 𝑓 𝜅#|𝑆# = 𝑗,Φ 𝑃𝑟 𝑆# = 𝑗.4,#4, 		 	 	 	 	 												(27)		where	𝑗	represents	the	two	states,	𝑓 𝜅#|𝑆# = 𝑗,Φ 	is	the	likelihood	function	for	state		𝑗 	conditional	on	the	set	of	parameters	Φ	in	equation	(26).		The	dynamics	of	the	switching	process	is	driven	by	the	transition	matrix;		
𝑃 = 𝑝,,, 𝑝.,,𝑝,,. 𝑝.,. ,	where	𝑝, 	is	the	probability	of	switching	from	state	𝑗	to	𝑖.	The							results	 are	 presented	 in	 table	 5.	 The	 transition	 probabilities	 represent	 the	 usual	persistence	 observed	 in	 output	 data.	 Given	 that	 the	 economy	 is	 in	 a	 recessionary	(expansionary)	phase,	it	is	very	likely	that	we	will	stay	in	that	phase.	The	parameter	of	note	is	𝛽.,	which	is	what	I	use	as	a	proxy	for	𝜅.	Parameter	𝜅	is	almost	three	times	higher	in	 expansions,	 which	 mean	 the	 ability	 of	 investors	 to	 raise	 capital	 in	 expansions	 is	higher,	as	I	had	expected.	The	coefficients	are	statistically	significant	at	the	1%	level.		These	 results	 suggest	 that	 a	 negative	 shock	 in	 home	 country	will	 have	 a	more	severe	effect	on	macro	variables	during	 recessions.	One	 should	also	expect	 to	 see	 the	correlation	 between	 home	 and	 foreign	 to	 be	 stronger	 during	 recessions	 than	expansions.		Using	the	estimated	values	for	𝜅,	in	the	next	section	I	analyze	the	impulse	responses	of	shocks	to	both	productivity	and	financial	sector.									
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Table	5:	Estimated	results	of	the	Markov	Switching	model	on	Leverage	Ratio		
Maximum	Likelihood	Estimates		 Dependent	variable:	𝜅#	
	Leverage	ratio	of	banks:	Tier	1	capital	to	total	assets		 coefficient		 standard	error	𝛽	 0.19	 .8	𝛽,	 0.895***	 0.249	𝛽,	 -0.152***	 0.019	𝛽,,	 -0.046**	 0.023	𝛽.	 0.28***	 0.009	𝛽.,	 0.791***	 0.057	𝑝,	 0.9	 	𝑝,,,	 0.78	 	AIC	 382	 	BIC	 449	 	Sample	period	is	from	1995-2012		***,	**,	*	represents	significance	at	the	1%,	5%	and	10%	level		
	
	
	
	
3.10 International	transmission	of	shocks	
	 In	 this	 section	 I	 look	 at	 the	 effect	 of	 productivity	 and	 financial	 shocks	 to	 both	home	 and	 foreign	 countries.	 When	 looking	 at	 negative	 productivity	 shock	 in	 home	country,	I	calculate	the	responses	using	𝜅=0.28	and	𝜅=0.791	for	both	with	and	without	transactions	 costs	𝜏.	 This	 exercise	 will	 enable	 me	 to	 test	 whether	 cross	 country	correlations	 are	 stronger	 during	 recessions.	 With	 transactions	 costs,	 I	 would	 expect	home	investors	to	not	diversify	completely	causing	the	effect	on	foreign	country	to	be	smaller.	When	imposing	a	shock	to	the	leverage	parameter,	𝜅	(equation	25),	I	calculate	
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the	responses	without	transactions	costs.	The	responses	in	both	home	and	foreign	are	to	consumption	of	final	goods	by	investors	and	savers,	asset	prices,	investor	borrowing,	asset	allocation,	home	country	trade	surplus	and	the	global	lending	rate.	
3.11	Productivity	shock	First	I	concentrate	on	the	impact	of	a	one	percent	negative	productivity	shock	in	the	 home	 country.	 Figures	 2	 through	 5	 illustrates	 these	 effects.	 Figures	 2	 and	 3	represent	 the	case	where	 the	 leverage	constraint	 is	high,	𝜅=0.791	and	 figures	4	and	5	assumes	𝜅=0.28.	The	case	where	𝜅=0.791	would	imply	that	investors	can	leverage	their	capital	more	easily.	This	was	the	behavior	observed	in	the	decade	prior	to	the	crash	of	2007	where	investors	could	borrow	without	much	capital	requirement.	I	am	using	such	environment	 as	 a	 proxy	 for	 good	 economic	 times,	 or	 business	 cycle	 expansions.	 The	case	where	𝜅=0.28	would	then	imply	that	borrowing	is	tougher	representing	economic	downturns.			Figure	 2	 assumes	 that	 investors	 can	 borrow	 unrestrictedly	 from	 home	 and	foreign	without	any	transactions	fees.	Investors	satisfy	condition	in	equation	4.	Figure	3	includes	 such	 international	 fees.	 Transactions	 costs	 are	 incorporated	 in	 the	model	 by	ensuring	that	investors	hold	seventy-five	percent	of	home	equity.6	(Devereux	&	Yetman,	Leverage	 constraints	 and	 the	 international	 transmission	 of	 shocks,	 2010)	 A	 fall	 in	𝐴#	causes	 an	 immediate	 fall	 in	 home	 output	 and	 thus	 reduces	 wages	 for	 savers	 and	investors	 and	 asset	 prices	 in	 home	 country.	 This	 reduces	 home	 consumption.	 Lower	demand	 for	 foreign	 assets	 reduces	 foreign	 asset	 prices,	 wages	 and	 consumption	 in	foreign	 country.	 However,	 the	 degree	 of	 reduction	 is	 more	 severe	 at	 home	 than	 in	foreign.	 In	 the	 case	 with	 transactions	 costs	 (figure	 3),	 consumption	 in	 home	 falls	 by	more.	 This	 happens	 because	 due	 to	 transactions	 costs,	 cross	 country	 channels	 are																																																																					6	Investors	chose	values	for	𝑘,-and	𝑘.- 	to	satisfy	equation	4’	such	that	𝑘,- = .75𝑘,- 	
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slightly	subdued.	With	a	diversified	portfolio,	the	shock	also	generates	a	valuation	effect	for	home	investors,	causing	home	investor’s	net	foreign	assets	to	rise.	Simultaneously,	this	 reduces	 foreign	 investor’s	 net	 foreign	 asset	 and	 a	 tightening	 of	 foreign	 leverage	constraint.	 This	 leads	 to	 a	 reduction	 in	 borrowing	 by	 foreign	 investors	 as	well.	 Thus,	both	 home	 and	 foreign	 investment	 falls	 sharply.	 This	 is	 a	 result	 of	 financial	 links	between	countries	since	there	was	no	productivity	shock	in	foreign	country.	Thus,	fall	in	foreign	investment	takes	place	purely	through	balance	sheet	linkages.		Adding	 transactions	 costs	 reduces	 the	 cross-country	 effects	 due	 to	 home	investors	 bias	 towards	 home	 assets.	 Greater	 portfolio	 diversification	 leads	 to	 greater	sensitivity	of	 foreign	balance	sheets	to	domestic	asset	price,	and	thus	a	 larger	balance	sheet	contraction	 to	a	negative	home	productivity	shock.	This	means	 that	 the	country	where	 the	 shock	 occurs	 is	 less	 important	 than	 the	 pattern	 of	 equity	 holdings	 of	investors	for	business	cycle	responses.					
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Figure	2:	High	leverage	constraint,	no	transactions	costs	
	
	
		Impulse	responses	of	a	one	percent	negative	productivity	shock	with	leverage	constraint	being	high	𝜅=0.791,	integrated	bond	markets	(𝑅# = 𝑅#∗),	and	integrated	equity	markets	with	complete	portfolio	diversification	(𝜏 = 0)	
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Figure	3:	High	leverage	constraint,	with	transactions	costs		
	
	
	
			Impulse	responses	of	a	one	percent	negative	productivity	shock	with	leverage	constraint	being	high,	𝜅=0.791,	integrated	bond	markets	(𝑅# = 𝑅#∗),	and	integrated	equity	markets	with	incomplete	portfolio	diversification	(𝜏 > 0)	
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Figures	 4	 and	 5	 look	 at	 the	 case	 where	𝜅=0.28	 and	 figure	 6	 measures	 the	difference	in	home	and	foreign	consumption	based	on	the	value	for	𝜅.	A	lower	estimate	for	𝜅	from	 the	 markov	 switching	 model	 represents	 times	 of	 economic	 downturn	 as	measured	 by	 NBER.	 The	 impulse	 responses	 under	 a	 lower	𝜅	implies	 how	 home	 and	foreign	economies	would	 react	 to	a	negative	productivity	 shock	during	 recessions.	As	hypothesized	earlier,	both	consumption	and	borrowing	 fall	by	a	 larger	percent	with	a	lower	𝜅.	 Moreover,	 the	 degree	 to	 the	 synchronous	 behavior	 of	 reduced	 consumption	and	investment	is	greater	during	recessions.	As	illustrated	in	figure	6,	the	difference	in	fall	 in	 consumption	 between	 the	 countries	 is	 far	 smaller	 during	 recessions	 than	expansions.	 There	 is	 clearly	 a	 positive	 co-movement	 of	 economic	 activity	 across	countries	with	integrated	equity	and	bond	markets.		These	 results	 support	 the	 fact	 that	 during	 recessions,	 consumers	 reduce	spending	 and	 investors	 reduce	 borrowing	 by	 more	 than	 they	 increase	 during	expansions,	as	 I	had	suspected.	And	these	affects	are	more	severe	due	to	the	 financial	linkages	and	cross-country	spillovers.	Thus,	it	is	no	surprise	that	during	the	2007	crisis,	global	 economic	 contraction	 was	more	 severe	 and	 synchronous	 than	 the	 increase	 in	economic	activity	before	and	since	the	crisis.		Financial	 integration	 in	 equity	 and	 bond	markets	 allow	 for	 cross-country	 risk-sharing.	But	as	seen	in	this	chapter,	it	also	generates	a	“contagion”	effect,	which	is	more	severe	during	recessions	than	expansions.	The	ease	with	which	investors	can	diversify	their	portfolio	has	certainly	increased	the	degree	of	macroeconomic	co-movement.						
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Figure	4:	Low	leverage	constraint,	no	transactions	costs		
	
	
	
	
			Impulse	responses	of	a	one	percent	negative	productivity	shock	with	leverage	constraint	being	low,	𝜅=0.28,	integrated	bond	markets	(𝑅# = 𝑅#∗),	and	integrated	equity	markets	with	complete	portfolio	diversification	(𝜏 = 0)		 			
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Figure	5:	Low	leverage	constraint,	with	transactions	costs	
	
	
	
	 	
	 	
			Impulse	responses	of	a	one	percent	negative	productivity	shock	with	leverage	constraint	being	low,	𝜅=0.28,	integrated	bond	markets	(𝑅# = 𝑅#∗),	and	integrated	equity	markets	with	incomplete	portfolio	diversification	(𝜏 > 0)				
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Figure	6:	Difference	in	variables	across	business	cycles	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
3.12			Financial	sector	shock	
	Another	contribution	of	 this	chapter	 is	 to	study	negative	 financial	 sector	shock	on	 home	 and	 foreign	 countries.	 This	 shock	 is	 governed	 by	 equation	 (25).	 Again,	 the	most	 globally	 integrated	 version	 of	 the	 Devereux	 and	 Yetman	 model	 is	 used.	 A	 one	percent	fall	 in	𝜅	represents	a	negative	financial	sector	shock.	Figure	7	shows	the	effect	of	such	a	shock	to	home	and	foreign	consumption,	asset	prices,	borrowings	by	investors,	asset	holdings	and	lending	rate.		There	is	perfect	co-movement	between	asset	prices	and	fixed	assets	between	the	two	 countries,	 which	 is	 very	 different	 to	 earlier	 shocks.	 Since	 there	 is	 no	 direct	productivity	 shock	 in	 either	 country,	 investors	 allocate	 fixed	 assets	 identically	 across	countries,	 leading	 to	 identical	 asset	 prices.	 Despite	 the	 financial	 shock	 affecting	 only	home	country	investors,	the	shock	leads	to	a	perfect	co-movement	of	asset	prices	and	
 		Difference	in	impulse	responses	from	a	one	percent	negative	productivity	shock	across	low	and	high	leverage	constraints,	𝜅=0.28,	0.791,	integrated	bond	markets	(𝑅# = 𝑅#∗),	and	integrated	equity	markets	with	complete	portfolio	diversification	(𝜏 = 0)	
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Figure	7:	Financial	sector	shock,	without	transactions	costs		
	
	
	
					 			Impulse	responses	of	a	one	percent	negative	financial	shock	with	integrated	equity	and	bond	markets	(𝑅# = 𝑅#∗),	with	complete	portfolio	diversification	(𝜏 = 0)				
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allocation.	The	level	of	borrowing	however,	contracts	much	sharply	for	home	investors	than	foreign	investors.	This	might	signify	a	 loss	 in	faith	due	to	uncertainty	in	financial	home	markets.	Consumption	in	both	countries	 falls	sharply,	but	 increases	temporarily	beyond	 the	 steady	 state	 for	 foreign	 investors	 and	 savers.	 The	 global	 interest	 rate	declines	sharply	due	to	low	investments	but	start	to	rise	as	borrowings	increase.			
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CHAPTER	4:	TEMPORAL	AGGREGATION	AND	MONEY	NEUTRALITY	TESTS	FOR	G-7					
																										COUNTRIES	
	 The	 function	 of	 money	 in	 an	 economy	 has	 been	 a	 central	 question	 for	 policy	makers.	 In	 this	chapter,	 I	perform	the	Fisher	and	Seater	 (1993)	and	King	and	Watson	tests	 for	 G-7	 countries	 using	 different	 frequency	 data	 to	 test	 for	 biases	 arising	 from	temporal	aggregation.	Temporal	aggregation	can	bias	neutrality	test	results	because	of	its	impact	upon	the	sample	autocorrelations	in	the	data.	The	contribution	of	my	work	is	to	 test	whether	 temporal	 aggregation	 biases	 the	 results	 in	 any	way.	 VAR-based	 tests	results	 in	 the	 finding	 of	 neutrality	when	data	 is	 temporally	 aggregated.	 For	 countries	with	monthly	data	 available,	 those	 tests	 strongly	 reject	money	neutrality,	where	non-neutrality	gets	rejected	at	quarterly	and	annual	frequency.	Results	from	single	equation	Fisher	 and	 Seater	 (F&S)	 tests	 point	 towards	 money	 to	 be	 not	 neutral	 and	 are	 not	affected	 by	 temporal	 aggregation.	 Those	 tests,	 however	 do	 find	 that	 effect	 of	 money	dissipates	over	time	for	most	countries.		The	next	section	sets	the	framework	for	the	F&S	tests	with	section	4.2	doing	the	same	for	VAR	based	K&W	tests.	Section	4.3	examines	the	results.					
4.1 	Fisher	and	Seater’s	ARIMA	framework	Fisher	 and	 Seater	 develop	 a	 framework	 of	 log	 linear,	 stationary	 ARIMA	model	with	 log	of	nominal	money	supply	𝑚#	and	 log	of	 real	GDP	𝑦#	as	 the	 two	variables.	The	ARIMA	 framework	 provides	 a	 convenient	 setting	 where	 one	 can	 test	 nonstructural	tests.	They	find	that	order	of	integration	of	both	money	and	the	macro	variable	used	is	important	 when	 testing	 for	 long	 run	 neutrality	 (LRN)	 and	 long	 run	 super-neutrality	(LRSN).	 Specifically,	 the	 relative	 order	 of	 integration	 matters.	 To	 test	 for	 LRN	 they	derive	the	long	run	derivative	of	money	on	macro	variable	of	interest.	To	start,	the	two	equations	of	interest	are:	
		
45	
𝑎 𝐿 ∆  𝑚# = 𝑏 𝐿 ∆ ¡ 𝑦# + 𝑢#															 	 	 	 	 																												(1)		𝑑 𝐿 ∆ ¡ 𝑦# = 𝑐 𝐿 ∆  𝑚# + 𝑤#																																																											 	 																												(2)									 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 										where	 𝑚 	and	 𝑦 	are	 the	 orders	 of	 integration	 for	𝑚# 	and	𝑦# 	respectively.	 The	difference	operator	∆	ensures	that	the	variables	are	integrated	of	order	zero,	I(0)	.	They	assume	𝑎=𝑑=1	 and	𝑏,	𝑐	are	 not	 restricted.	 The	 LRN	 experiments	will	 depend	 on	 a	shock	 to	 the	 exogenous	 money	 supply	 disturbance	𝑢#	and	 how	 that	 impacts	 macro	variables.	 The	 treatment	 of	 the	 disturbance	𝑢# 	requires	 appropriate	 identification	restrictions	 described	 later.	 The	 vector	 of	 errors	 (𝑢#,𝑤#)′ 	are	 independent	 and	identically	distributed	with	zero	mean	and	variance	covariance	matrix	Σ,	to	be	
= 𝜎££ 𝜎£¤𝜎¤£ 𝜎¤¤ 	If	one	assumes	𝑥# = ∆𝑚#	and	𝑧# = ∆𝑦#	where	𝑖	and	𝑗	are	equal	and	either	0	or	1,	 then	to	test	LRN	and	LRNS	one	needs	to	define	the	long	run	effect	of	a	permanent	change	in	𝑥#	on	𝑧# .	This	long	run	effect	is	measured	by	the	long	run	derivative	of	𝑧	with	respect	to	𝑥,	LRDz,x;	
𝐿𝑅𝐷¦,q = lim©→3 𝜕(𝑧#F©) 𝜕(𝑢#)𝜕(𝑥#F©) 𝜕(𝑢#) 	The	numerator	measures	 the	effect	of	an	exogenous	money	disturbance	on	 the	macro	variable	of	interest	through	time	and	the	denominator	looks	at	that	same	effect	on	money	 itself.	 As	 stated	 in	 Fisher	 and	 Seater,	 if	 the	 limit	 of	 the	 denominator	 term	𝜕(𝑥#F©) 𝜕(𝑢#)	approaches	 zero,	 LMN	 and	 LMSN	 cannot	 be	 tested	 (Fisher	 &	 Seater,	1993).	 In	 other	words,	when	 there	 are	 no	permanent	 changes	 in	monetary	 variables,	there	is	nothing	to	test.		Therefore	 lim𝑘→∞ 𝜕(𝑥#F©) 𝜕(𝑢#) ≠ 0	and	 𝑚 ≠ 0	As	in	F&S,	equations	(1)	and	(2)	can	be	written	using	the	Wold	representation	of		
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∆𝑚#∆𝑦# = 𝑎(𝐿) −𝑏(𝐿)−𝑐(𝐿) 𝑑(𝐿) K, 𝑢#𝑤# = 𝛼(𝐿) 𝛽(𝐿)𝛾(𝐿) 𝜆(𝐿) 	 𝑢#𝑤# 																																																										(3)		where;	𝛼 𝐿 = 𝑑 𝐿 / 𝑎 𝐿 𝑑 𝐿 − 𝑏 𝐿 𝑐 𝐿 		𝛾 𝐿 = 𝑐 𝐿 / 𝑎 𝐿 𝑑 𝐿 − 𝑏 𝐿 𝑐 𝐿 		𝛽 𝐿 = 𝑏 𝐿 / 𝑎 𝐿 𝑑 𝐿 − 𝑏 𝐿 𝑐 𝐿 		𝜆 𝐿 = 𝑎 𝐿 / 𝑎 𝐿 𝑑 𝐿 − 𝑏 𝐿 𝑐 𝐿 		F&S	show	that	for	(𝑥) ≥ 1	the	long	run	derivative,	LRDz,x	can	be	rewritten	as;	
𝐿𝑅𝐷¦,q = 1 − 𝐿 q K ¦ 𝛾(𝐿)/²4,𝛼(1) 	and	the	derivative	will	depend	on	 𝑥 − 𝑧 .	F&S	examine	various	cases	for	the	order	of	integration	of	𝑥	and	𝑧	to	get	the	LRD.	To	consider	the	I(1)	property	observed	for	money	and	output,	as	in	Rossana	and	Hu,	I	look	at	the	case	where	 𝑥 = 𝑧 = 1.	(Rossana	&	Hu,	2017)7	This	 restriction	 also	 implies	 that	 changes	 in	 both	 money	 and	 output	 are	permanent	 thus	 allowing	 us	 to	 test	 for	 LRN.	 Certain	 very	 broad	measures	 of	 money	(M4)	are	found	to	be	I(2),	but	 I	use	M2	for	all	 tests	and	do	not	run	into	that	problem.	With	 the	 case	where	 𝑥 = 𝑧 = 1,	 LRN	 is	 equivalent	 to	 testing	whether	 the	 long	 run	derivative	equals	zero	when	using	real	variables	or	one	when	using	nominal	variables.	Thus,	from	equation	(3)	testing	for	neutrality	is	equivalent	to	testing	the	restriction		𝑐 1 /𝑑 1 	=	0	or	1	where	𝑏 1 = 𝜎£¤ = 0.	 This	 makes	 only	 estimating	 equation	 (2)	 relevant	 of	 the	 two	equations	system.																																																																									7	This	is	following	the	work	by	Nelson	and	Plosser	(1982),	that	find	most	macro	variables	including	output	and	money	to	be	I(1).	
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4.11	Identification	and	Estimation		To	 deal	with	 the	 identification	 problem,	 there	 are	 two	 specific	 schemes	 under	which	one	can	consistently	estimate	equation	(2),	as	pointed	in	F&S	and	Rossana	&	Hu.	𝑑 𝐿 ∆ ¡ 𝑦# = 𝑐 𝐿 ∆  𝑚# + 𝑤#	Under	the	first	one,	the	covariance	term	in	equation	(2)	𝑐 =	𝜎£¤ 	is	assumed	to	be	zero.	The	current	value	of	change	in	money	does	not	enter	equation	(2).	This	is	appropriate	when	 using	 real	 output,	 which	 does	 not	 respond	 to	 a	 change	 in	 money	contemporaneously	when	using	short	measurement	period	 i.e.	monthly.	Since	most	of	my	data	are	quarterly	and	yearly,	 this	 scheme	will	not	be	 relevant.	The	other	scheme	involves	 assuming	 	𝑏 =	𝜎£¤ 	to	 equal	 zero.	 In	 this	 case	 money	 is	 predetermined	 in	equation	 (1).	 It	 is	 possible,	 however,	 that	 neither	 schemes	 are	 acceptable.	 But	 as	pointed	 by	 F&S,	𝑐 𝐿 /𝑑 𝐿 	are	 structural	 and	 not	 of	 interest.	 Only	 the	 reduced	 form	𝑐 1 /𝑑 1 	are	of	relevance,	which	can	be	estimated	directly	in	the	frequency	domain.		
A	General	Scheme	The	 reduced	 form	 representation	𝑐 1 /𝑑 1 	is	 of	 importance	 in	 conducting	 these	
statistical	 tests.	 The	 autocovariance	 generating	 function	 for	 the	 vector	 ∆𝑚#∆𝑦# 	can	defined	to	be	𝑀 𝑧 = 𝐻(𝑧)∑𝐻(𝑧K,)Q,	and	the	spectrum	at	frequency	𝜔	is	then	𝑆	 𝜔 = 𝑀(𝑒K) 2𝜋.	When		∆ ¡ 𝑦#	is	regressed	on	∆  𝑚#	at	frequency	zero	𝜔 = 0,	the	estimated	 coefficient	 equals	𝑆.,(0)/𝑆,,(0) = 𝑀.,(1)/𝑀,,(1).	 This	 equals	𝑐 1 /𝑑 1 	if	the	following	restriction	is	met:		𝑏 1 = 𝜎£¤ = 0																																																																																																																																						(4)	Thus,	 testing	LRN	involves	estimating	and	testing	𝑆.,(0)/𝑆,,(0).	Condition	(4)	 implies	that	a	permanent	change	in	output	has	no	effect	on	money	in	the	long	run	and	allows	for	
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both	𝑏	and	𝑐	to	 be	 non-zero.	 Thus,	 money	 is	 exogenous	 in	 the	 long	 run,	 which	 is	crucial	in	neutrality	tests.		
Estimation	Under	the	General	Scheme	By	regressing	change	 in	output	on	change	 in	money	at	 zero	 frequency,	 the	coefficient	𝑆.,(0)/𝑆,,(0)	is	 the	 LRN	 under	 the	 general	 identification	 scheme,	 which	 implies	exogeneity	 of	 money	 supply.	 Frequency	 zero	 spectrums	𝑆., 0 	𝑎𝑛𝑑	𝑆,,(0)	need	 to	 be	estimated.		
𝑆., 0 = 12𝜋 𝛾¡(ℎ)3·4K3 																																																																																																																	(5)	
𝑆,, 0 = 12𝜋 𝛾(ℎ)3·4K3 																																																																																																																(6)	where	𝛾(ℎ)	is	 the	h-th	order	autocorrelation	for	change	 in	money	and	𝛾¡(ℎ)	is	 the	h-th	 order	 cross-correlation	 between	 change	 in	 output	 and	 change	 in	 money.	Nonparametric	 estimation	 needs	 to	 be	 used	 for	 estimating	 the	 spectrums	 since	 the	sample	 periodograms	 for	𝑆., 0 	𝑎𝑛𝑑	𝑆,,(0)	obtained	 by	 replacing	 the	 sample	 cross-correlations	 and	 autocorrelations	 in	 (5)	 and	 (6)	 are	 inaccurate,	 albeit	 unbiased	estimators	 with	 large	 sample	 size.	 Therefore,	 Bartlett	 kernel	 of	 the	 zero-frequency	regression	 coefficient	 is	 used,	 which	 can	 be	 calculated	 using	moving	 averages	 of	 the	observations.	This	is	because	as	pointed	in	Priestley,	the	Bartlett	estimator	smooths	the	periodogram	using	linearly	decreasing	weights.	(Priestley,	1981)	As	pointed	out	in	F&S,	the	 Bartlett	 estimator	 of	 the	 frequency-zero	 regression	 coefficient	 can	 be	 seen	 by	writing	 the	 covariance	 of	 the	 moving	 averages	 of	 the	 observations	 in	 terms	 of	 the	aotocovariances:				
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𝑐𝑜𝑣 𝑚# − 𝑚#K©, 𝑦# − 𝑦#K© = 𝑐𝑜𝑣 ∆©K,4 𝑚#K, ∆©K,4 𝑦#K
= 𝛾¡ 𝑖 − 𝑗 = 𝑘º»¼ 0 + 2 𝑘 − 𝑖©K,4©K,4©K,4 𝛾¡(𝑖)	and	the	Bartlett	estimator	of	the	zero-frequency	ratio	𝑆., 0 /𝑆,,(0)	can	be	estimated	as	lim©→3 𝑏© ,	where	𝑏© 	is	the	slope	coefficient	from	the	regression		∆ ¡ 𝑦#K = 𝑎© + 𝑏© ∆ ¡ 𝑚#K + 𝑒©#©4©4 																		 		 	 																											(7)		For	the	case	where	 𝑚 = 𝑦 = 1,	which	is	what	I	look	at	here,	equation	(7)	becomes:	(𝑦# − 𝑦#K©) = 𝑎© + 𝑏© 𝑚# − 𝑚#K© + 𝑒©#																										 	 	 	 														(8)	The	 assumption	 of	m	 and	 y	 to	 be	 of	 order	 1	 is	 a	 common	 practice	 in	 this	 literature.	(Sulku,	 2011)	 (Ekomie	 &	 Jacques,	 2013)	 The	 estimator:	𝑐 1 /𝑑 1 	is	 obtained	 from	equation	 (8)	 as	 lim©→3 𝑏© .	 In	 this	 case,	𝑏© 	is	 the	 slope	 scatterplot	 of	 output	 and	 money	growth	rates	and	the	Bartlett	estimator	is	the	limit	of	that	slope	as	the	span	over	which	those	growth	rates	are	computed	goes	to	infinity.			 Hence,	 testing	 for	 LRN	 involves	 only	 estimating	 equation	 (8).	 Next	 section	develops	 the	 VAR	 tests	 for	 LRN	 and	 the	 following	 section	 summarizes	 the	 data	 and	results	from	both	the	Fisher	and	Seater	single	equation	and	King	and	Watson	bivariate	VAR	tests.		
4.2 Bivariate	VAR	Test	VAR	 tests	 for	 neutrality	 and	 superneutrality	 developed	 by	 King	 and	 Watson	 (1997)	provides	another	common	toolset.	The	VAR	equations	modeling	output	and	money	are:		
∆𝑦# = 𝜆¡∆𝑚# + 𝛼,¡¡∆𝑦#K +½4, 𝛼,¡∆𝑚#K +
½
4, 𝜀#																																																									(9)	
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∆𝑚# = 𝜆¡∆𝑦# + 𝛼,¡∆𝑦#K +½4, 𝛼,∆𝑚#K +
½
4, 𝜀#																																																						(10)	where	the	VAR	is	of	order	p.	To	test	for	contemporaneous	money	and	output	effects,	I	use	the	augmented	VAR	framework	of	K&W.	The	framework	used	is:	∆𝑦#∆𝑚# = 𝜆¡ 𝑜𝑜 𝜆¡ ∆𝑚#∆𝑦# + 𝛽¡¾ 𝐿 𝛽¡ 𝐿𝛽¾ 𝐿 𝛽 𝐿 𝜉#¾𝜉# 																																																								(11)			where	 contemporaneous	 effects	 of	money	 and	 output	 is	 allowed,	∆	is	 the	 differencing	operator,	 the	 matrix	𝛽(𝐿)	contains	 lag	 polynomials	 that	 transmit	 the	 effects	 of	 iid	shocks,	𝜉#	and	𝜉#¾ .		If	the	fraction:	
𝛾¡ = 𝛽¡(1)𝛽(1) = 0	then	money	is	neutral	since	a	permanent	shock	to	money	has	no	effect	on	output.	𝛽(1)	is	the	sum	of	the	coefficients	in	the	lag	polynomial	𝛽(𝐿).	Since	I	will	be	using	monthly	data	 for	my	 estimations,	 following	Rossana	 and	Hu	 (2017),	 I	will	 be	 assume	𝜆¡ = 0.		Without	making	such	an	assumption	one	must	estimate	𝜆¡	and	𝜆.	King	and	Watson	provide	a	possibility	of	estimating	one	of	these	parameters	in	a	reduced	form	VAR	using	GMM	 since	 it	 is	 not	 possible	 to	 identify	 both	𝜆¡	and	𝜆.	 They	 do	 not	 use	 high	frequency	data	and	as	pointed	by	Rossana	and	Hu,	lags	between	money	and	output	are	typically	 longer	 than	 a	 quarter.	 Thus,	 the	 assumption	 of	𝜆¡ = 0	seems	 empirically	justifiable.	 For	 estimations	 using	 annual	 frequency,	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 such	 an	assumption	can	be	misleading.	Including	intercepts,	the	VAR	becomes:	
	 ∆𝑦#∆𝑚# = 𝜇¡𝜇 + 𝛽¡¾(𝐿) 𝛽¡(𝐿)𝛽¾(𝐿) 𝛽(𝐿) 𝜉#¾𝜉# 																																																																																	(12)	which	can	be	transformed	into		
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𝛽¡¾(𝐿) 𝛽¡(𝐿)𝛽¾(𝐿) 𝛽(𝐿) K, ∆𝑦#∆𝑚# − 𝜇¡𝜇 = 𝜉#¾𝜉# 																																																																										(13)		
Let	the	inverse	matrix	 𝛽¡¾(𝐿) 𝛽¡(𝐿)𝛽¾(𝐿) 𝛽(𝐿) K,which	will	be	estimated,	be	written	as		
𝛼 𝐿 = 𝛼,,(𝐿) 𝛼,.(𝐿)𝛼.,(𝐿) 𝛼..(𝐿) = 𝛽¡¾(𝐿) 𝛽¡(𝐿)𝛽¾(𝐿) 𝛽(𝐿) K, = 𝛽(𝐿) K, 	 𝛽(𝐿) −𝛽¡(𝐿)−𝛽¾(𝐿) 𝛽¡¾(𝐿) (9)		and	finally,	the	VAR	to	be	estimated	becomes	𝛼,,(𝐿) 𝛼,.(𝐿)𝛼.,(𝐿) 𝛼..(𝐿) 	 ∆𝑦#∆𝑚# − 𝜇¡𝜇 = 𝜉#¾𝜉# 																																																																																	(14)	and	the	estimate	for	money	neutrality	is		𝛾¡ = −ÀSX(,)ÀSS(,)																																																																																																																																		(15)	For	 money	 to	 be	 neutral,	𝛾¡	must	 equal	 zero	 and	𝛼,,(1) ≠ 0,	 otherwise	 tests	 for	neutrality	 cannot	 be	 done.	 In	 estimating	𝛾¡,	 the	 estimation	 of	 the	 standard	 errors	become	 crucial,	 since	 the	 significance	 of	 the	𝛾¡	parameter	 will	 depend	 on	 it.	 As	 in	Rossana	&	Hu,	I	use	the	delta	method	to	construct	the	standard	errors.	The	polynomials	in	the	matrix	𝛽(𝐿)	are	in	the	bivariate	vector	moving	average	process	where	neutrality	measure	is	defined	and	𝛼(𝐿)	are	the	parameters	to	be	estimated.	The	standard	errors	are	constructed	by	computing	the	matrix	multiplication	𝑉QΣ	𝑉where	Σ	is	the	parameter	covariance	matrix	and	V	is	the	vector	
𝑉 = − 𝜕𝛾¡𝜕𝛼,,𝜕𝛾¡𝜕𝛼,. 																																																																																																																																							(16)	
	
	
		
52	
4.3	Empirical	Results	This	section	presents	the	empirical	evidence	of	temporal	aggregation	of	data	on	neutrality	 tests.	 All	 results	 were	 obtained	 using	 MATLAB	 and	 STATA	 software.	 My	contribution	 to	 this	 literature	 is	 to	 investigate	 whether	 temporal	 aggregation	 biases	results	from	the	single	equation	Bartlett	or	the	bivariate	VAR	estimators.		I	 calculate	 this	estimate	 to	 test	LMN	 for	all	G-7	countries.	The	data	 is	obtained	from	the	OECD,	IMF,	St.	Louis	Federal	Reserve	and	Bank	of	England	databases.	A	detail	description	of	the	years	and	frequency	of	data	used	is	presented	in	Appendix	D.	For	U.S,	U.K	and	Japan	all	units	across	all	variables	are	in	local	country	currency.	For	the	other	European	 countries,	 all	 output	 and	 consumption	measures	 are	 in	 local	 currency	 and	money	is	in	domestic	country	Euros.	In	other	words,	it	represents	the	Euros	issued	for	each	of	 those	countries	 individually	and	not	 for	 the	Euro	area	as	a	whole.	Augmented	Dickey	Fuller	(ADF)	tests	are	performed	on	the	data	to	test	for	unit	root	and	variables	are	 found	 to	 be	 I(1)	 (Dickey	 &	 Fuller,	 1981).	 All	 the	 figures	 estimating	 the	 Bartlett	kernel,	𝑏© 	as	𝑘	becomes	large	are	in	Appendix	E.	Long	run	neutrality	would	exist	if	this	parameter	goes	to	zero	over	time.		One	commonly	documented	problem	when	testing	neutrality	tests	is	the	effects	of	 aggregated	 data.	 (Rossana	 &	 Seater,	 1995)	 As	 pointed	 out	 in	 their	 paper,	 there	 is	substantial	 loss	 of	 information	 in	 moving	 from	 high	 frequency	 monthly	 data	 to	quarterly	 data	 and	 coefficients	 results	 from	 regression	 are	 dramatically	 affected.	(Rossana	&	Seater,	1995)	They	point	out	that	using	high	frequency	data	is	preferred.	I	test	for	temporal	aggregation	biases	using	methods	in	Rossana	&	Hu	(2017).	For	the	U.S.	and	 U.K,	 I	 use	 real	 consumption	 and	M2	 (M3	 for	 U.K)	 to	 derive	 aggregated	monthly,	quarterly	and	annual	data	and	compare	it	quarterly	and	yearly	real	GDP	and	M2	(M3	for	
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U.K).	 For	 the	 other	 five	 countries,	 I	 do	 the	 same	 using	 quarterly	 real	 GDP	 and	M2	 to	derive	lower	frequency	data.			
4.31	Fisher	and	Seater	Single	Equation	Evidence	Appendix	E	has	all	the	figures	containing	the	Bartlett	estimator	𝑏© .	Figures	11-15	show	 neutrality	 tests	 for	 the	 U.S.	 Figures	 11-13	 represent	 monthly,	 quarterly	 and	annual	real	consumption	and	M2	using	temporally	aggregated	monthly	data	and	figures	14	 and	 15	 are	 using	 quarterly	 and	 yearly	 Real	 GDP	 and	 M2	 data	 respectively.	 The	results	are	very	similar	across	data	frequencies	and	consistently	 find	money	to	be	not	neutral.	Non-neutrality	disappears	as	lag	length	increases.	For	lag	lengths	between	ten	to	 twelve	 years,	 the	 consumption	 effects	 are	 close	 to	 zero,	 but	 not	 quite	 within	 the	standard	 error	 at	 monthly	 and	 quarterly	 frequencies.	 However,	 at	 annual	 frequency,	consumption	effects,	within	the	standard	error,	reach	zero	around	the	nine-year	mark.	So,	money	is	neutral	at	 the	annual	 level	using	temporally	aggregated	monthly	data.	At	very	long	lags	for	all	estimates,	beyond	around	the	fourteen-year	mark,	the	parameters	at	all	 frequency	increase	sharply.	However,	one	must	be	cautious	 in	reading	too	much	into	 the	 results	at	very	 long	 lags	due	 to	decreasing	sample	size.	One	surprising	 result	from	all	 these	 tests	 is	 that	money	 is	not	neutral	at	very	short	 lag	 lengths.	Economists	widely	 agree	 that	 there	 is	 a	 lag	 on	 the	 effect	 of	 money	 on	 real	 variables	 and	 so	 we	should	see	money	to	be	neutral	at	very	short	lag	lengths.	Overall,	for	the	U.S.	temporal	aggregation	 has	 minimal	 effect	 on	 Bartlett	 parameter	 estimates.	 And	 money	 is	 not	neutral	where	non-neutrality	dissipates	around	year	ten.		In	figure	14,	using	quarterly	real	GDP	and	M2,	at	very	short	lag	length	money	has	no	effect	on	output.	This	is	perhaps	the	most	appealing	result	in	the	case	for	U.S,	since	this	 is	what	economic	wisdom	would	suggest	we	should	observe.	Beyond	 lag	of	 three,	money	 effects	 real	 macro	 activity	 which	 dissipates	 over	 time.	 Neutrality	 is	 reached	
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around	 lag	 length	 of	 thirty	 using	 quarterly	 data.	 Using	 annual	 data,	 in	 figure	 15,	neutrality	is	reached	around	the	ten-year	mark,	but	then	non-neutrality	arises	at	longer	lag	lengths.		Figures	16-18	represent	test	results	for	Canada.	Like	what	I	observed	for	the	U.S.,	data	 aggregation	 does	 not	 matter	 for	 Canada	 either	 when	 going	 from	 quarterly	 to	annual	 frequency.	Figure	16	uses	quarterly	Real	GDP	and	M3	and	 finds	 that	money	 is	neutral	at	very	short	lag	length	of	one,	which	dissipates	quickly.	Neutrality	reaching	at	lag	length	forty-five	or	about	fifteen	years	within	one	standard	error.	When	aggregating	quarterly	data	 into	annual	 in	 figure	17,	 there	 is	 strong	evidence	 for	money	neutrality	within	the	standard	error	and	money	has	no	effect	on	real	output	until	year	ten.	Again,	as	mentioned	before	at	higher	frequencies,	due	to	smaller	sample	one	must	be	cautious.	At	annual	frequency	money	is	neutral	at	very	small	lag	lengths,	which	is	what	one	would	expect,	but	neutrality	dissipates	quickly.	As	is	evident	from	figures	17	and	18,	temporal	aggregation	is	not	important.	Results	from	Canada	at	all	frequency	are	appealing	since	we	can	confidently	say	that	money	has	no	effect	on	real	variables	in	the	very	short	run.	France:	 Figures	 19-21	 represent	 test	 results	 for	 France.	 Data	 aggregation	 does	 not	matter	 for	 France	 when	 going	 from	 quarterly	 to	 annual	 frequency.	 Figure	 19	 uses	quarterly	 Real	 GDP	 and	M2	 and	 finds	 that	money	 is	 neutral,	 and	 neutrality	 does	 not	dissipate	until	after	7	years.	When	aggregating	quarterly	data	into	annual	in	figure	20,	there	is	strong	evidence	for	money	neutrality	within	the	standard	error	and	money	has	no	 effect	 on	 real	 output.	 At	 annual	 frequency,	 the	 results	 are	 very	 similar	 to	 those	reached	 under	 temporal	 aggregation.	 As	 is	 evident	 from	 figures	 19	 and	 20,	 temporal	aggregation	 is	 not	 important.	 Results	 from	 France	 at	 all	 frequency	 strongly	 support	monetary	neutrality.	One	does	have	 to	be	a	 little	 careful	 in	 the	validity	of	 tests	 for	all	European	countries	due	to	such	small	sample	sizes.		
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Figures	22-24	represent	 test	 results	 for	Germany	where	data	aggregation	does	not	matter	when	going	from	quarterly	to	annual	frequency.	Figure	22	finds	that	money	is	 not	 neutral,	 and	 non-neutrality	 does	 not	 dissipate	 at	 any	 frequency.	 When	aggregating	quarterly	data	 into	annual	 in	 figure	23,	money	 is	not	neutral,	where	non-neutrality	dissipates	at	 lag	 lengths	of	 ten.	At	annual	 frequency	 (figure	24),	 the	 results	are	identical	to	those	reached	with	temporal	aggregation.	As	is	evident	from	figures	23	and	 24,	 temporal	 aggregation	 is	 not	 important.	 For	 the	 case	 of	 Germany,	 temporal	aggregation	matters	a	little	and	LRN	is	weakly	supported.		Figures	 25-27	 represent	 test	 results	 for	 Italy	where	 data	 aggregation	matters.	Figure	25	finds	that	money	is	not	neutral,	and	non-neutrality	does	not	dissipate	at	any	frequency.	 When	 aggregating	 quarterly	 data	 into	 annual	 in	 figure	 26,	 money	 is	 not	neutral.	 At	 annual	 frequency	 (figure	 27),	 the	 results	 look	 very	 different	 to	 those	obtained	 with	 temporal	 aggregation.	 As	 is	 evident	 from	 figures	 26	 and	 27,	 temporal	aggregation	is	important,	but	neither	support	long	run	neutrality.	For	the	case	of	Italy,	temporal	 aggregation	 matters	 and	 money	 effects	 real	 variables	 across	 all	 lags	 and	temporal	aggregation.	Figures	28-30	represent	test	results	for	Japan.	Figure	28	finds	that	money	is	not	neutral	 when	 using	 quarterly	 data,	 and	 non-neutrality	 does	 not	 dissipate	 at	 any	frequency.	When	aggregating	quarterly	data	into	annual	in	figure	29,	money	is	neutral	at	very	short	lags	of	two	after	which	it	is	not	neutral.	At	annual	frequency	in	figure	30,	the	neutrality	that	is	observed	with	temporal	aggregation	disappears.	As	is	evident	from	figures	29	and	30,	temporal	aggregation	is	important.		Lastly	figures	31-35	represent	monthly,	quarterly	and	annual	real	consumption	and	M3	using	temporally	aggregated	monthly	data	and	quarterly	and	yearly	Real	GDP	and	M3	respectively	for	United	Kingdom.	The	results	are	very	similar	across	quarterly	
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and	 annual	 frequencies,	 with	 and	 without	 temporal	 aggregation.	 All	 frequency	 and	aggregation	techniques	consistently	find	money	to	be	neutral.	Money	has	no	real	effects	on	 macro	 variables	 in	 the	 very	 short	 run	 in	 all	 cases,	 which	 is	 very	 promising.	 For	consumption	data	neutrality	lasts	for	four	to	six	years	after	which	money	is	non-neutral.	So,	 money	 is	 neutral	 at	 the	 quarterly	 and	 annual	 levels	 using	 temporally	 aggregated	monthly	data.	Overall,	for	the	U.K.	temporal	aggregation	has	minimal	effect	on	Bartlett	parameter	estimates,	as	was	seen	for	U.S.	Using	quarterly	and	yearly	real	GDP	and	M3,	neutrality	is	reached	very	quickly	and	dissipates	around	year	eight	to	ten.		
4.32	Bivariate	VAR	evidence	Table	 6	 reports	 the	 estimated	 neutrality	 measures	 and	 the	 corresponding	 standard	errors	from	the	VAR	framework	for	U.S	and	U.K.	For	the	remaining	five	countries,	these	results	are	presented	in	Appendix	E.	Lag	lengths	for	the	tests	were	chosen	using	Hannan	and	Quinn	 (1979)	method	 as	 they	 are	 known	 to	 be	 consistent.	 A	 parameter	with	 ***	signifies	that	for	that	time	frequency,	we	can	reject	the	fact	that	gamma	is	statistically	different	from	zero	with	ninety-nine	percent	confidence.	**	and	*	represent	the	level	of	certainty	at	the	ninety-five	and	ninety	percent	levels.		
Table	6:	VAR	results	for	United	States	
Date	frequency	 Measure	 Lag	length	 𝜸𝒎	 Standard	Error	
Monthly	 Real	C	and	M2	 3	 0.155***	 0.059	Quarterly	 Real	C	and	M2	 3	 0.264**	 0.129	Quarterly	 Real	GDP	and	M2	 2	 0.339	 0.57	Annual	 Real	C	and	M2	 1	 0.185	 0.135	Annual	 Real	GDP	and	M2	 1	 0.247	 0.139		
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Table	7:	VAR	results	for	United	Kingdom		
Date	frequency	 Measure	 Lag	length	 𝜸𝒎	 Standard	error	
Monthly	 Real	C	and	M3	 3	 0.167***	 0.066	Quarterly	 Real	C	and	M3	 3	 0.314**	 0.139	Quarterly	 Real	GDP	and	M3	 3	 0.219	 0.457	Annual	 Real	C	and	M3	 2	 0.585	 0.561	Annual	 Real	GDP	and	M3	 1	 0.654	 0.537		 VAR	 tests	 clearly	 signify	 that	 temporal	 aggregation	 can	distort	neutrality	 tests.	For	the	U.S,	results	at	monthly	frequency	strongly	reject	monetary	neutrality	since	the	coefficient	is	significantly	different	from	zero	at	the	one	percent	level.	But,	as	data	gets	temporally	 aggregated,	 non-neutrality	 results	 become	 less	 compelling	with	 neutrality	emerging	when	using	annual	data.	Thus,	confidence	 in	non-neutrality	declines	as	data	gets	 temporally	 aggregated.	The	optimal	 lag	 lengths	decrease	 as	data	 gets	 aggregated	from	quarterly	to	annual,	but	not	when	going	from	monthly	to	quarterly.		Results	from	the	U.K	shows	that	money	is	not	neutral	at	the	one	percent	and	ten	percent	 levels	 using	 monthly	 and	 temporally	 aggregated	 quarterly	 data.	 However	monetary	neutrality	exists	when	data	gets	aggregated	at	the	annual	frequency.		For	the	remaining	countries,	the	results	are	presented	in	Appendix	E,	tables	11	through	15.	Using	quarterly	data	money	is	significantly	different	from	zero	for	Canada,	France	and	 Italy,	but	non-neutrality	cannot	be	rejected	 for	 Japan	and	Germany.	When	aggregating	quarterly	data	to	get	annual	frequency,	money	is	neutral	for	Canada,	Japan	and	Germany,	but	neutrality	is	strongly	rejected	for	Italy	and	France.	Annual	level	data	
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rejects	non-neutrality	for	all	countries.	Hence,	the	results	for	all	seven	countries	suggest	that	VAR	results	are	very	sensitive	to	temporal	aggregation.				 Sensitivity	of	results	 to	 lag	 length	chosen	 is	well	known	in	VAR	literature.	King	and	Watson	use	lag	lengths	of	six	in	their	studies.	To	compare	the	dynamic	adjustment	period	 from	Bartlett	estimates	 (Fisher	and	Seater),	 I	 calculated	 impulse	 responses	 for	all	countries	to	orthogonalized	innovations	in	the	estimated	VAR’s	and	found	the	results	to	be	consistent.	These	impulse	responses	are	not	reported	in	this	paper.		 To	summarize,	 the	Bartlett	estimator	 is	unaffected	by	temporal	aggregation	for	five	of	seven	countries	but	the	results	from	the	VAR	approach	is	extremely	sensitive	for	six	 of	 seven	 countries.	 Japan	 being	 an	 interesting	 case	 where	 F&S	 tests	 consistently	rejects	neutrality,	but	the	VAR’s	do	not	for	all	frequency	and	aggregations.				 													
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CHAPTER	5:	CONCLUSION	Chapter	1	uses	an	already	developed	testable	theoretical	model	to	test	the	effects	of	international	linkages	in	financial	markets	and	their	impact	on	macro	variables.	I	use	the	 model	 developed	 by	 Devereux	 and	 Yetman	 to	 build	 a	 two-country	 model	 with	financial	 linkages	through	 investors	borrowing	 from	savers	 in	both	home	and	foreign.	The	 ability	 of	 investors	 to	 lend	 to	 final	 goods	 producing	 firms	 creates	 the	 channels	through	 which	 borrowing	 and	 these	 international	 effects	 take	 place.	 I	 further	 the	literature	on	international	macroeconomics	by	testing	whether	these	financial	linkages	have	a	more	profound	effect	during	recessions	than	expansions.				Results	suggest	that	contractions	in	both	consumption	by	savers	and	lenders	and	investment	in	both	home	and	foreign	are	stronger	during	recessions	than	in	expansions.	I	measure	this	effect	by	looking	at	leverage	constraints	faced	by	investors;	Tier	1	assets	to	 capital	 by	 major	 banks	 amongst	 fourteen	 countries.	 I	 assume	 that	 investors	 face	tighter	 leverage	 constraints	during	 recessions	 than	expansions.	This	happens	because	savers	require	investors	to	hold	more	capital	to	asset	ratio	during	economic	downturn.	Other	 authors	 calibrate	 this	 parameter	 and	 assume	 it	 to	 be	 constant.	 This	 paper	employs	a	Markov	regime	switching	model	to	estimate	this	parameter	using	maximum	log	 likelihood	method.	Using	output	data	for	the	U.S,	 I	 find	the	parameter	for	 leverage	constraints	 to	 be	 more	 than	 three	 times	 higher	 during	 expansions	 than	 recessions,	implying	that	investors	face	a	severe	tightening	of	funds.		This	results	board	well	for	public	policymaking	where	most	central	banks	lower	interest	 rates	and	easy	 lending	during	 recessions.	This	was	especially	 true	during	 the	recession	of	2007.	An	important	result	for	countries	that	are	financially	integrated	with	the	rest	of	the	world	is	that	when	a	negative	shock	is	experienced	in	another	country,	the	home	country	can	act	preemptively.				
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A	second	contribution	of	chapter	1	 is	 to	 include	shocks	directly	 in	the	 financial	markets.	 I	 then	 look	 at	 both	 a	 negative	 productivity	 and	 financial	 sector	 shock.	 A	surprising	result	of	the	financial	shock	is	that	there	is	perfect	correlation	in	asset	prices	in	home	and	foreign.	Lastly,	chapter	2	looks	at	neutrality	tests	using	Fisher	and	Seater	method	across	G-7	countries	and	finds	mixed	results	in	support	of	long	run	neutrality	of	money.	 The	 long	 debated,	 theoretically	 sound	 and	 yet	 empirically	 inconclusive	 LMN	does	not	get	any	clearer	after	my	tests.		There	 are	 a	 few	 extensions	 to	 my	 first	 chapter	 that	 are	 worth	 mentioning.	Building	 capital	 adjustments	 across	 international	 portfolios,	 estimating	 the	 other	parameters	and	including	a	central	banking	mechanism	into	the	model	would	make	this	economy	more	realistic.	Including	monetary	policy	by	central	banks	might	help	capture	some	of	the	missing	dynamics	of	financial	linkages.		The	 chapter	 on	neutrality	 tests	provides	 a	much	 less	 convincing	 support	 of	 its	hypothesis.	Using	the	Fisher	and	Seater	Bartlett	estimators,	money	is	neutral	for	France,	Germany	 and	 U.K.	 VAR	 results	 suggest	 the	 same	 for	 Japan,	 Germany	 and	 U.K.	 for	 all	frequencies.	 Even	 though	 proving	 monetary	 neutrality	 is	 a	 mixed	 bag,	 a	 convincing	aspect	 of	 the	 Fisher	 and	 Seater	 tests	 is	 that	 the	 results	 are	 unaffected	 by	 temporal	aggregation.	This	is	an	appealing	feature	of	the	F&S	tests.	VAR	results	on	the	other	hand	are	extremely	sensitive	to	temporal	aggregation	and	must	be	considered	with	caution.		Money	 plays	 a	 very	 important	 role	 in	 an	 economy	 and	 it	 would	 be	 worth	 including	monetary	variables	in	the	two-country	model	from	chapter	1.		One	 aspect	 of	 neutrality	 tests	 I	 did	 not	 consider	 are	 biases	 from	 structural	change.	The	data	 set	used	by	Fisher	 and	Seater	 in	 their	original	work	was	using	data	from	 Friedman	 and	 Schwartz	 (1982),	which	 covers	 U.S.	 data	 from	 1867	 to	 1975.	We	know	 that	 data	 in	 that	 time-period	 had	 several	 structural	 breaks	 from	 the	 Industrial	
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Revolution	to	monetary	policy.	It	would	be	worthwhile	to	run	the	tests	I	do	here	across	the	different	regimes	for	these	countries	to	get	a	more	robust	understanding.					
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APPENDIX	A		
Investors	maximize	equation	(1)	subject	to	equations	(2)	and	(3).	Bellman	equation	is:		𝑉 𝑘,#K,,	𝑘.#K,,	𝐵#K, = 𝑈 𝐶#- + 𝐸#𝛽- 𝐶#- 	𝑉 𝑘,#- , 𝑘.#- , 𝐵,# + 𝜆# 𝑊#- + 𝑞,# + 𝑅,N# 𝑘,#K,- +𝑞.# + 𝑅.N# 𝑘.#K,- + 𝐵#- − 𝑅#K,- 	𝐵#K,- − 𝐶#- − 𝑞,#𝑘,#- − 𝑞.#𝑘.#- + 𝜇# 𝜅 𝑞,#𝑘,#- + 𝑞.#𝑘.#- −𝐵#- 																																																																															 			 	 	 																																														(I-1)		where	𝑘,#- ,	𝑘.#- 	and	𝐵#- 	are	 the	 state	 variables	 and	𝐶#- 	the	 control	 variable.	𝜆# 	is	 the	multiplier	 on	 the	 budget	 constraint	 and	𝜇#	the	 multiplier	 on	 the	 leverage	 constraint,	𝜇#being	positive	means	that	the	investor	would	like	to	borrow	more.		FOC:	𝐶#: 𝑈Q 𝐶#- = 	 𝜆#																							 	 	 	 	 	 																									(I-2)	𝐵#:	𝐸#𝛽- 𝐶#- ÅÆ •ÅÈ# = 	−𝜆# + 𝜇#																 	 	 	 	 	 																									Envelope	Theorem	states	that				dv •db#K, = 𝜕𝑣(•)𝜕𝑏#K, = −𝜆#𝑅#K,	𝑎𝑛𝑑	𝑠𝑜	 𝑑𝑣 •𝑑𝑏𝑡 = 	−𝜆#F,𝑅#		𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒	𝐸#𝛽- 𝐶#- 𝜆#F,𝑅#+	𝜇#	 = 	 𝜆#					 	 	 	 	 											(I-3)		𝑘,#	:	𝐸#𝛽- 𝐶#- 𝜆#F,(𝑞,#F, + 𝑅,N#F,)) = 𝜆#𝑞,# − 𝜇#	𝜅	𝑞,#	 	 	 											(I-4)		𝑘.#	:	𝐸#𝛽- 𝐶#- 𝜆#F, 𝑞.#F, + 𝑅.N#F,) = 𝜆#𝑞.# − 𝜇#	𝜅	𝑞.#		 	 	 											(I-5)		combining	the	FOC’s	we	get	the	Euler	equations	𝐶#	&	𝑘,# ⤇ 𝑈Q 𝐶#- = 𝐸#𝛽- 𝐶#- 𝑈′ 𝐶#F,- RSTUS	F	VSWTUSRST + 𝜇#	𝜅				 	 											(I-6)	𝐶#	&	𝑘.# ⤇ 𝑈Q 𝐶#- = 𝐸#	𝛽- 𝐶#- 𝑈Q 𝐶#F,- RXTUS	F	VXÎ,TUSRXT + 𝜇#	𝜅	 																									(I-7)	𝐶#&	𝐵# 	⤇ 𝑈Q 𝐶#- = 𝐸#	𝛽- 𝐶#- 𝑈Q 𝐶#F,- 	𝑅# +	𝜇#		 	 	 	 											(I-8)	Facing	 leverage	 constraints	 does	 not	 impose	 any	 restrictions	 on	 diversifying	 the	portfolio	 of	 equity	 holdings.	 (3)	 restriction	 applies	 equally	 to	 borrowing	 domestic	 or	foreign	equity.	Hence	(I-6)	and	(I-7)	gives	us	the	portfolio	selection	condition:	𝐸#𝑈Q 𝐶#F,- RSTUS	F	VSW,TUSRST 	− 	RXTUS	F	VXÎ,TUSRXT = 0	 	 	 	 											(I-9)		Like	Devereux	and	Yetman,	I	define	𝑟,,#F, = RSTUS	F	VSW,TUSRST 	and	the	previous	equation	can	be	written	as		
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	𝐸#𝑈Q 𝐶#F,- 𝑟,,#F, − 𝑟.,#F, = 0								 	 	 	 	 	 									(I-10)		combining	equations	(I-6),	(I-7)	and	(I-8)	we	can	solve	for	𝜇#			𝜇#	 = 𝐸#𝛽- 𝐶#- 𝑈′ 𝐶#F,- ÏSTWSTÏSTWSTUÏXTWXT ÏSTUSUÐSWTUSÏST F ,K ÏSTWSTÏSTWSTUÏXTWXT ÏXTUSUÐXWTUSÏXT KVT,Km	 	 																																																																																																																						(I-10)		This	shows	that	when	𝜇#	 > 0,	the	expected	return	on	the	portfolio	exceeds	the	cost	of	borrowing.	Using	(I-10)	one	can	derive	the	optimal	equity	portfolio	for	investors.					
Savers	maximize	equation	(5)	subject	to	equations	(7).	Bellman	equation	is:		𝑉 𝑘,#K,,𝛣#K, = 𝑈 𝐶# + 𝐸#𝛽 𝐶# 𝑉 𝑘,#,𝐵# + 𝜆#[𝐶#] + 𝑞,#	𝑘,#] −𝑊#] − 𝑞,#𝑘,#K,] −𝐺 𝑘,#K,] − 𝐵#] + 𝐵#K,] 𝑅#K,]																																																																																															(S-1)		FOC:	𝐶#: 𝑈′𝐶#) = −𝜆#																																																																																																																					(S-2)	𝑘,#: 𝐸#𝛽] 𝐶#] −𝜆#K, 𝑞,#F, + 𝐺Q 𝑘,#] = −𝜆#𝑞,#																																																					(S-3)	𝐵#: 𝐸#𝛽 𝐶# −𝑅#𝜆#F, = 𝜆#																																																																																															(S-4)		combining	the	FOC’s		𝐶#	&	𝑘,# ⤇	𝑈Q 𝐶#] = 𝐸#𝛽] 𝐶#] 𝑈Q 𝐶#F,] 	 RSTUSFÒ	Q ©STlRST 																																							(S-5)		𝐶#	&	𝐵# ⤇ 𝑈Q 𝐶#] = 𝐸#𝛽] 𝐶#] 𝑈Q 𝐶#F,] 𝑅#																																																																(S-6)		
Production	Firms	maximize	(8)	subject	to	equation	(10)		FOC:	𝐿# ⤇ 𝑊# = 𝐴#𝐹,(𝐿#	, 𝐾#K,)																																																																																													(F-1)	𝐾#K, ⤇ 𝑅,N,# = 𝐴#𝐹.(𝐿#	, 𝐾#K,)	 	 	 	 	 	 							(F-2)	𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐴# = 𝜌𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝐴#K, + 𝜐#	
	
System	of	Equations:	
	As	mentioned	in	section	3	of	the	paper	the	equilibrium	is	described	by	equations	2,	3,	7,12,	I-6,	I-7,	I-8,	S-5,	S-6,	F-1,	F-2	for	home	and	foreign	along	with	a	single	global	equation	11	and	13.		𝐶#- + 𝑞,#𝑘,#- + 𝑞.#𝑘.#- + 𝑅#K,𝐵#K,- = 𝑊#- + 𝑞,# + 𝑅,N# 𝑘,#K,- + 𝑞.# + 𝑅.N# 𝑘.#K,- +𝐵#- 											 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 																									(2)		𝐵#- ≤ 𝜅 𝑞,#𝑘,#- + 𝑞.#	𝑘.#- 	 	𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒																																																																																						(3)		
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𝐶#] + 𝑞,#k,#] = 𝑊#] + 𝑞,#	𝑘,#K,] + 𝐺 𝑘,#K,] + Β#] − 𝐵#K,] 𝑅#K,		 	 												(7)		𝑈Q 𝐶#- = 𝐸#𝛽- 𝐶#- 𝑈′ 𝐶#F,- RSTUS	F	VSWTUSRST + 𝜇#	𝜅				 	 	 										(I-6)	𝑈Q 𝐶#- = 𝐸#	𝛽- 𝐶#- 𝑈Q 𝐶#F,- RXTUS	F	VXÎ,TUSRXT + 𝜇#	𝜅	 	 	 										(I-7)	𝑈Q 𝐶#- = 𝐸#	𝛽- 𝐶#- 𝑈Q 𝐶#F,- 	𝑅# +	𝜇#		 	 	 	 	 											(I-8)	𝑈Q 𝐶#] = 𝐸#𝛽] 𝐶#] 𝑈Q 𝐶#F,] 	 RSTUSFÒ	Q ©STlRST 		 	 	 	 											(S-5)		𝑈Q 𝐶#] = 𝐸#𝛽] 𝐶#] 𝑈Q 𝐶#F,] 𝑅#																																																																																								(S-6)		𝑊# = 𝐴#𝐹,(𝐿#	, 𝐾#K,)	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 										(F-1)	𝑅,N,# = 𝐴#𝐹.(𝐿#	, 𝐾#K,)	 	 	 	 	 	 	 										(F-2)	𝑛𝑘,,#- + 𝑛𝑘,,#-∗ + 1 − 𝑛 𝑘,,#] = 1																									 	 	 	 												(12)		𝑛 𝐵#- + 𝐵#-∗ + 1 − 𝑛 𝐵#] + 𝐵#]∗ = 0																			 	 	 	 												(11)			𝑛 𝐶#- + 𝐶#-∗ + 1 − 𝑛 𝐶#] + 𝐶#]∗ = 𝐴#	𝐹(1, 𝑛(𝑘,,#K,- + 𝑘,,#K,-∗ )) +𝐴#∗	𝐹 1, 𝑛 𝑘.,#K,- + 𝑘.,#K,-∗ + 1 − 𝑛 𝐺 𝑘,,#K,] + 𝐺(𝑘.,#K,]∗ ) 																															(13)		(I-6)	and	(I-7)	are	combined	into	(I-9)	or	equation	(4),	(4’)	in	the	paper.		
	
Solution	as	developed	in	(Devereux	&	Sutherland,	Country	portfolios	in	open	economy	macro	models,	2011)	
	The	 system	 of	 equations	 is	 solved	 by	 log-linearizing	 around	 a	 non-stochastic	 steady	state	by	 computing	 the	 second	order	approximation	of	 the	portfolio	 equation	4	along	with	a	first	order	approximation	of	the	rest	of	the	model.	In	a	two-country	model	with	portfolio	choices	we	have:		𝐸#𝑈Q 𝐶#F,- RSTUS	F	VSW,TUSRST 	− 	RXTUS	F	VXÎ,TUSRXT = 0	 	 	 	 											(I-9)			𝐸#𝑈Q 𝐶#F,- 𝑟,,#F, − 𝑟.,#F, = 0								 	 	 	 	 	 									(I-10)		where	𝑟,,#F, = RSTUS	F	VSW,TUSRST 	and	𝑟q,#F, = 𝑟,,#F, − 𝑟.,#F, 		Equation	(I-9)	exists	for	home	and	foreign:		𝐸#𝑈Q 𝐶#F,- 𝑟q,#F, = 0	and	𝐸#𝑈Q 𝐶#F,-∗ 𝑟q,#F, = 0																																																								(I-11)	
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APPENDIX	B	Appendix	B	contains	the	data	source	used	in	section	5	to	estimate	the	Markov	estimate:		Annual	frequency	data	for	leverage	ratio	is	from	a	commercial	database	maintained	by	the	 International	 Bank	 Credit	 Analysis	 (IBCA).	 U.S	 real	 GDP	 measure	 is	 from	 OECD	database.	The	data	for	both	real	GDP	and	leverage	ratio	is	from	1995-2012	amongst	14	OECD	countries.	This	range	of	years	includes	multiple	business	cycles.			
Table	8:	Summary	of	country	and	bank	asset	database		
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Table	9:	Summary	statistics	for	Tier	1	capital	to	total	assets	and	output
	
			 	
	
	
Table	10:	Unit	root	tests	for	Tier	1	capital	to	total	assets	and	output	
Variable	 ADF	I(1)	 PP	I(1)	Log	Real	GDP	 -6.8**	(1)	 -7.03**	(1)	Log	tier	1	capital	to	assets	 -13.6**	(1)	 -11.6*	(1)	5%	significance	level	is	denoted	by	**	Lag	length	is	chosen	using	SIC	criteria	and	is	represented	in	parenthesis															
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APPENDIX	C		The	 impulse	 responses	 from	 the	 two-country	 DSGE	 model	 with	 Monto	 Carlo	 error	bands	 are	 presented	 here	 for	 select	 variables.	 The	 dashed	 blue	 lines	 are	 the	 bands	around	the	home	curves	and	the	black	dashed	lines	for	foreign.		
Figure	8:	Productivity	shock	with	high	leverage	constraint,	no	transactions	costs	
(corresponds	to	Figure	2)	
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Figure	9:	Productivity	shock	with	low	leverage	constraint,	with	transactions	costs	
(corresponds	to	Figure	5)	
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Figure	10:	Financial	sector	shock,	without	transactions	costs		
(corresponds	to	Figure	7)	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
-2.4
-1.8
-1.2
-0.6
0
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
(c)	Asset	in	final	goods	sector
Total	home	equity Total	foreign	equity
-0.6
-0.4
-0.2
0
0.2
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
(a)		Consumption
Home Foreign
-4
-3.5
-3
-2.5
-2
-1.5
-1
-0.5
0
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
(b)	Borrowing
Home Foreign
		
70	
APPENDIX	D	Appendix	D	describes	the	data	used	for	money	neutrality	tests.	Data	sources	include	the	International	 Monetary	 Fund	 (IMF),	 Organization	 for	 Economic	 Co-Operation	 and	Development	(OECD),	St.	Louis	Federal	Reserve	and	the	Bank	of	England.	In	converting	money	 variables	 from	 higher	 to	 lower	 frequencies,	 the	 standard	 stock	 conversion	method	 of	 using	 the	 last	 monthly	 or	 quarterly	 measurement	 in	 the	 year	 is	 used	 to	generate	 lower	 frequency	data.	For	output	and	consumption,	 the	method	of	 summing	monthly	to	get	quarterly	and	quarterly	to	get	annual	data	is	used.		
Table	11:	Data	description	for	Money	Neutrality	F&S	and	VAR	tests		 Variable	 Frequency	 Time	 Source	
Canada	 M3	 Quarterly	 1970Q1-2017Q1	 IMF	M3	 Annually	 1970-2016	 IMF	GDP	 Quarterly	 1970Q1-2017Q1	 OECD	GDP	 Annually	 1970-2016	 OECD	
France	 M2	 Quarterly	 1980Q4-1998Q4	 IMF	M2	 Annually	 1977-1998	 IMF	GDP	 Quarterly	 1980Q4-1998Q4	 OECD	GDP	 Annually	 1960-2016	 OECD	
Germany	 M2	 Quarterly	 1970Q1-1998Q4	 IMF	M2	 Annually	 1970-1998	 IMF	GDP	 Quarterly	 1970Q1-1998Q4	 OECD	GDP	 Annually	 1970-1998	 OECD	
Italy	 M2	 Quarterly	 1974Q1-1998Q2	 OECD,	IMF	M2	 Annually	 1974-1998	 OECD,	IMF	GDP	 Quarterly	 1974Q1-1998Q2	 OECD	GDP	 Annually	 1974-1998	 OECD,	IMF	
Japan	 M2	 Quarterly	 1970Q1-2016Q4	 IMF	M2	 Annually	 1970-2016	 IMF	GDP	 Quarterly	 1970Q1-2016Q4	 OECD	GDP	 Annually	 1970-2016	 OECD	
United	Kingdom	
M3,	Index	 Monthly	 M121986-M82016	 OECD	M3,	Index	 Quarterly	 1987Q1-2016Q4	 IMF	M3,	Index	 Annually	 1983-2016	 OECD	C	 Monthly	 M121986-M82016	 BOE	GDP	 Quarterly	 1987Q1-2016Q4	 OECD	GDP	 Annually	 1983-2016	 OECD	
United	States	
M2	 Monthly	 1960-2016	 IMF	M2	 Quarterly	 1960Q1-2017Q1	 IMF	M2	 Annually	 1960-2016	 IMF	C	 Monthly	 1960M1-2016M12	 St.	Louis	Fed	GDP	 Quarterly	 1960Q1-2017Q1	 OECD	GDP	 Annually	 1960-2016	 OECD	
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APPENDIX	E	
	Money	neutrality	 results	 using	 Fisher	&	 Seater	methodology	using	different	 temporal	aggregation	 schemes	 for	 G-7	 countries.	 The	 graphs	 below	 represent	 the	 Bartlett	Parameter	Estimates	with	confidence	interval	bands	around	the	parameter.		
United	States		
Figure	11:	Monthly	Real	Consumption	and	M2	
		 	 	
Figure	12:	Aggregated	quarterly	Real	Consumption	and	M2		
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Figure	13:	Aggregated	annual	Real	Consumption	and	M2	
	
Figure	14:	Quarterly	Real	GDP	and	M2	
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Figure	15:	Annual	Real	GDP	and	M2	
	
	
Canada	
	
Figure	16:	Quarterly	Real	GDP	and	M3	
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Figure	17:	Aggregated	annual	Real	GDP	and	M3	
	
Figure	18:	Annual	Real	GDP	and	M3	
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France		
Figure	19:	Quarterly	Real	GDP	and	M2	
		
Figure	20:	Aggregated	annual	Real	GDP	and	M2	
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Figure	21:	Annual	Real	GDP	and	M2	
	
Germany	
	
Figure	22:	Quarterly	Real	GDP	and	M2	
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Figure	23:	Aggregated	annual	Real	GDP	and	M2	
		
Figure	24:	Annual	Real	GDP	and	M2	
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Italy	
	
Figure	25:	Quarterly	Real	GDP	and	M2		
		
Figure	26:	Aggregated	annual	Real	GDP	and	M2	
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Figure	27:	Annual	Real	GDP	and	M2		
	
	
Japan		
Figure	28:	Quarterly	Real	GDP	and	M2	
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Figure	29:	Aggregated	annual	Real	GDP	and	M2		
		
Figure	30:	Annual	Real	GDP	and	M2	
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United	Kingdom	
	
Figure	31:	Monthly	Real	C	and	M3	
	
Figure	32:	Aggregated	quarterly	Real	C	and	M3		
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Figure	33:	Aggregated	annual	Real	C	and	M3	
		
Figure	34:	Quarterly	Real	GDP	and	M3	
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Figure	35:	Annual	Real	GDP	and	M3	
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APPENDIX	F	
	VAR	based	parameter	estimates	along	with	the	standard	error	using	the	delta	method	for	Canada,	France,	Germany,	Italy	and	Japan	are	summarized	in	Appendix	F.	Results	for	U.S	and	U.K	were	reported	within	the	paper	for	no	other	reason	than	the	fact	that	I	had	data	 at	 all	 three	 frequency	 for	 U.S	 and	U.K.	 The	 evidence	 is	more	 compelling	when	 I	could	 aggregate	data	 from	monthly	 to	quarterly	 and	 annual	 frequencies.	 *,	 **	 and	 ***	represents	 whether	 we	 are	 90,	 95	 and	 99	 percent	 sure	 that	 the	 parameters	 are	statistically	significantly	different	from	zero.	
Table	12:	VAR	results	for	Canada	
Date	frequency	 Measure	 Lag	length	 𝜸𝒎	 Standard	Error	Quarterly	 Real	GDP	and	M3	 3	 0.264**	 0.129	Aggregated	Annual	 Real	GDP	and	M3	 1	 0.185	 0.135	Annual	 Real	GDP	and	M3	 1	 0.254	 0.165	
	
Table	13:	VAR	results	for	France	
Date	frequency	 Measure	 Lag	length	 𝜸𝒎	 Standard	Error	Quarterly	 Real	GDP	and	M2	 3	 0.183*	 0.099	Aggregated	Annual	 Real	GDP	and	M2	 2	 0.285*	 0.188	Annual	 Real	GDP	and	M2	 1	 0.354	 0.211	
	
Table	14:	VAR	results	for	Germany	
Date	frequency	 Measure	 Lag	length	 𝜸𝒎	 Standard	Error	Quarterly	 Real	GDP	and	M2	 3	 0.186	 0.229	Aggregated	Annual	 Real	GDP	and	M2	 1	 0.301	 0.335	Annual	 Real	GDP	and	M2	 1	 0.29	 0.165	
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Table	15:	VAR	results	for	Italy		
Date	frequency	 Measure	 Lag	length	 𝜸𝒎	 Standard	Error	Quarterly	 Real	GDP	and	M2	 2	 0.198***	 0.061	Aggregated	Annual	 Real	GDP	and	M2	 1	 0.343*	 0.188	Annual	 Real	GDP	and	M2	 1	 0.609	 0.411	
	
Table	16:	VAR	results	for	Japan	
Date	frequency	 Measure	 Lag	length	 𝜸𝒎	 Standard	Error	Quarterly	 Real	GDP	and	M2	 3	 1.213	 1.019	Aggregated	Annual	 Real	GDP	and	M2	 1	 1.485	 1.088	Annual	 Real	GDP	and	M2	 1	 0.964	 0.811	
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